While microeconomics in its dominant avatar is very adept at standardizing the behaviour of an economic agent using a number of assumptions to simplify the problem at hand, macroeconomists have had an unenviable task of developing economic models that explain deviations from reality in the aggregate and the consequent unexpected crisis. Thus, Keynes had to develop his argument to explain the possibilities of less than full employment equilibrium against the backdrop of the great depression that shattered the Marshall–Say–Walras belief of automatic full employment through a general competitive equilibrium process and the neo-classical dichotomy based on money playing the only role of a medium of exchange. He linked employment to aggregate demand and emphasized the role of fiscal and monetary policies in pushing an aggregate economy out of distress by tackling care of the possible market failure through sticky wages. The ‘golden era’ between the Second World War and early 1970s passed smoothly without much macro-level economic crisis, resulting in engagements by the then economic thought leaders to develop a model of neo-classical-Keynes synthesis based on IS–LM interpretation, with dominant policy makers happily buying into such interpretation. Dangers of stagflation across the industrialized countries in the early 1970s brought back into prominence the school of monetarist thought centred around the supply side of the economy.