Human cognition surpasses the nonlocality tsirelson bound: Is mind outside of spacetime?

Kauffman, Stuart and Patra, Sudip (2022) Human cognition surpasses the nonlocality tsirelson bound: Is mind outside of spacetime? [Working papers (or Preprints)]

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Abstract

Recent experimental studies on human cognition, particularly where non-separable or entangled cognitive states have been found, show that in many such cases Bell or CHSH in-equalities have been maximally violated. The implications are that greater non-local correlations than allowed in quantum mechanics (often known as the Tsirelson bound), are found in human cognition. We propose in the current paper that a non-local theory of mind is needed in order to account for the empirical findings. This requires a foundationally different approach than the extant ‘quantum-like’ approach to human mind. Our account is novel, but still founded on a Hilbert space set up with the physical constraint of no-signalling. To account for the surpassing of the Tsirelson bound we propose abandoning the constraint of no-signalling that depends upon spacetime. Thus we ask; ‘Is mind outside spacetime?’ We discuss a candidate theory of quantum gravity based on non-locality as fundamental that may accord with our proposal. We are led to suggest a new 6 part ontological framework linking Mind, Matter, and Cosmos

Item Type: Working papers (or Preprints)
Keywords: Non-Locality | No-Signaling | Bell Inequalities | Tsirelson/Cirelson Bound | PR boxes | Cognition | Quantum Gravity | Six-Part Framework
Subjects: Social Sciences and humanities > Social Sciences > Social Sciences (General)
JGU School/Centre: Jindal School of Government and Public Policy
Depositing User: Amees Mohammad
Date Deposited: 02 Jan 2023 06:33
Last Modified: 02 Jan 2023 06:33
URI: https://pure.jgu.edu.in/id/eprint/5317

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