Repeated trade with two $ sided incomplete information

Banerjee, Shraman and Mishra, Debasis (2017) Repeated trade with two $ sided incomplete information. [Working papers (or Preprints)] (Unpublished)

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This paper presents a Önite-horizon bargaining model where each player has private valuation over the good for sale. The seller posts a price in each period, which the buyer has to accept, or reject. If he rejects, a new price is posted in the next period. Bargaining ine¢ ciencies arise due to incomplete information. We show that the probability of trade over all periods decreases when we increase the horizon of the game.

Item Type: Working papers (or Preprints)
Keywords: Bargaining | Efficiency | Repeated Trade
Subjects: Social Sciences and humanities > Business, Management and Accounting > Marketing
JGU School/Centre: Jindal School of Government and Public Policy
Depositing User: Mr Sombir Dahiya
Date Deposited: 09 May 2022 06:20
Last Modified: 09 May 2022 06:20
Official URL:


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