In papers written over the last decade, Kevin Toh has proposed a reconstruction of Hart's account of the normativity of law along non-cognitivist or expressivist lines. At the heart of Toh's project is the proposal that we understand Hart's internal legal statements as expressivist moral statements, which is to say, moral statements expressing the speaker's attitude of approval towards the law. It will be the burden of this paper to make the case for why Hart's internal legal statements are not best understood as moral statements, let alone 'expressivist' or 'non-cognitivist' moral statements. In doing so, I will be employing two strands of argument: the first will entail an assessment of the metaethical architecture underlying Toh's model; and the second will be exegetical in nature, involving an examination of whether Toh's proposed reconstruction can be integrated with the basic structure of Hart's scheme.