In the 1924 case Mkavromnmatis Palestine Concessions ("Mkavrommnatis"), the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") famously defined a "dispute" as a "disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons."' That case hinged upon whether there was a dispute between the United Kingdom and Greece and, if so, whether the United Kingdom, as the then Mandatory Power of Palestine, had violated certain of its international legal obligations related to concessions that had been granted to Greek national Mavrommatis in Mandatory Palestine. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Moore built upon the PCIJ's understanding of the nature of a dispute in describing it as a "pre-existent difference, certainly in the sense and to the extent that the government which professes to have been aggrieved should have stated its claims and the grounds on which they rest, and that the other government should have had an opportunity to reply, and if it rejects the demands, to give its reasons for so doing." 2 The Mkavromnmatis test for determining whether a disagreement simpliciter can be regarded as a legally-cognizable dispute is usually seen as reflecting general international law. The existence of a dispute, of course, is an absolute prerequisite for the application of the international law of dispute settlement.