The opinion authored by Justice Chandrachud in K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India has extensively employed philosophical and comparative materials in justifying a fundamental right to privacy under the Constitution of India. Here, we examine some implications of the reliance on such materials. We first argue that the court relies on a strong liberty-based zonal view of privacy. However, its reliance on Aristotle’s views is controversial, and reliance on JS Mill’s views does not immediately yield a strong zonal argument. The opinion’s aggregation of “intimacy-based”, “expectation-based”, and “other guarantees-based” justifications that are reflected in decisions in the USA also presents conceptual difficulties in understanding the composition of a private zone. We then point out that as in the USA and South Africa, liberty-based justifications in the opinion gradually gravitate towards autonomy-, personhood- and finally, dignity-based accounts. The opinion’s theoretical explanation of the relationship between these concepts however makes their individual content elusive and warrants ironing out of some inconsistencies that emerge. Dignity-based views may not yield a zonal argument like the liberty-based views employed by the opinion earlier. We then indicate that dignity-based arguments for privacy do have to contend with certain differences with liberty-based views owing to their distinct historical evolution in law, and in light of the liberty-restraining potential of dignity.