Financial Orders are Court-drawn reliefs when there is disagreement between partners on the division of finances. The paper seeks to answer a normative question, which is whether these financial orders should be judicially framed in a manner which actively promotes public goods. Public goods in this context have been understood to mean fairness, equality, and autonomy. This article is a philosophical justification and theoretical investigation into the role of financial orders vis-à-vis the advancement of these public goods. The paper first invariably addresses and examines the assumption as to the efficiency of financial orders as tools and Courts as efficient forums to promote public goods. I argue that the inherent design of the financial orders hinders the promotion of public goods. Moreover, market inequalities, undervaluation in workplaces, and socio-economic disadvantages have perpetuated true marginalisation, and a judicial remedy would not be competent to redress these structural changes. However, drawing from theories of relational vulnerability and ethics of care, I assess and emphasise the need for the Courts to encourage the promotion of these goods. Using three specific examples, I showcase the methodologies and pathologies of the promotion of equality as a public good by the Courts. Lastly, I conclude with the understanding that the attainment of public goods should not be the ultimate objective of financial orders. Careful consideration ought to be provided to the temporality of autonomy and its skewed linear nature. Financial orders conceptualise the ‘legal subject’ to transition seamlessly to an ‘open future’, unrestricted by the obligations arising from the marriage—a statement which might not be true for several partners in such relationships.