The FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar was marred by controversy. Unlike previous tournaments, these disagreements were not limited to referee decisions and calls made during the match. The tournament saw widespread human rights violations against migrant workers who had arrived in Qatar following FIFA’s announcement of Qatar hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2022. Despite the reforms introduced in Qatar, including abolition of the kafala system, the flaws in such reforms and the failures to enforce these reforms left workers exposed to wage theft, forced labor, and limited mobility. These abuses highlight the broader concerns about the accountability of international governing bodies like FIFA and their commitment to upholding all internationally recognized human rights under its Human Rights Policy, which was implemented in 2017. This paper critically examines the contractual leverage with FIFA under the Organizing Association Agreement (OAA). As per this contract, the leverage could have been utilized to compel the host nations to comply with the international labor standards and human rights obligations. The paper argues that FIFA had both the leverage and the precedent to enforce labour reforms but failed to exercise its authority under the agreement. By comparing the intervention of FIFA in the 2014 World Cup in Brazil to compel the nation to introduce reforms in its alcohol laws, the paper contends that FIFA’s selective application of such leverage prioritized the commercial benefits over the welfare of the workers. This paper adopts a doctrinal and comparative legal approach, combining analysis of international labour conventions, contractual instruments, and NGO reports with case studies of Qatar, Brazil, and Russia. This is done by examining the relevant international labor standards, including International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions No. 29 (Forced Labour), No. 87 (Freedom of Association), and No. 98 (Collective Bargaining), as well as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). The analysis demonstrates how both state actors and non-state entities like FIFA bear responsibilities under international law for transnational labor abuses. Finally, the paper offers forward looking recommendations for significant reforms, advocating for binding human rights clauses in FIFA’s bidding and hosting agreement, abolishment of the kafala system, the establishment of independent oversight mechanisms, enforceable remedies for the workers, and structural changes to increase transparency and accountability in the process. By proposing such enforcement models, the paper shows the global sports institutions how to align their operations with their human rights obligations.