On November 20, 2025, the Indian Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion on substantial questions concerning the nature and extent of gubernatorial power over state legislation. Although the Constitution clearly demarcates legislative powers between the Union and the states, state laws take effect only after receiving the Governor’s assent, an office nominated by the Union government.

Given this design, conflicts between Governors and state governments are almost inevitable, especially when different parties control the Union and the states. A recurring flashpoint is the Governor’s role once a bill is passed by the state legislature. Articles 200 and 201 authorize the Governor to assent to a bill, withhold assent, or reserve it for the President. Yet these provisions leave three critical questions unresolved: (1) Can the Governor withhold assent indefinitely and effectively paralyse state lawmaking? (2) Is there a time limit within which action must be taken? (3) What remedies exist if the Governor does nothing within a reasonable period?

These issues had recently arisen in a case decided in May 2025. Disagreeing with that ruling, the Court in the November advisory opinion held that the Governor’s powers under Articles 200 and 201 are discretionary and that courts cannot impose timelines for decision-making. In what follows, we analyse this advisory opinion and argue that it poses serious risks to India’s federal structure by enabling a de facto Union veto over state legislation. We also highlight the possible political motivations underlying the opinion and the troubling use of the advisory jurisdiction to unsettle a precedent.