This article aims to provide a balanced re-evaluation of the 1962 border conflict between India and China, challenging the dominant narrative of an unqualified Indian military defeat while incorporating an analysis of underexplored defensive successes. Using the critical theory of information as a guiding framework, it examines how political decisions, media narratives and operational complexities shaped public perceptions of the conflict. The study draws on Indian archival materials, War Diaries and media reports, supplemented by limited Chinese sources, to reconstruct a more nuanced understanding of the war.The findings reveal that the narrative of India’s defeat is incomplete, as it overlooks the significant resistance and casualties inflicted on Chinese forces in the Western and Easternmost sectors. The only sector where Indian positions fell rapidly because of early withdrawal from defences in Se La–Bomdila was marked by political interference, inadequate preparation and intense media scrutiny, disproportionately influencing the dominant narrative. Furthermore, the unilateral Chinese ceasefire underscores the prohibitive cost of their campaign, challenging simplistic conclusions about their military superiority.By revisiting this historical episode, the article highlights the potential for India and China to engage in more constructive dialogue regarding their bilateral relations and border disputes. It contributes to the literature on the Sino-Indian conflict by offering a critical perspective on military operations, narrative formation and the enduring relevance of this event in contemporary geopolitics.