Climate change disputes often include multifaceted challenges that transcend conventional commercial arbitration frameworks. While arbitration emerged to be one of the most viable dispute resolution mechanisms for addressing climate change disputes, an important question arises: Do general arbitration rulessuffice in effectively resolving climate change disputes, or are tailored climate-focused arbitration rules more efficient? Should parties prefer tailored rules if a climate change related dispute arises or do general rules suffice in handling the dispute with same precision? This article argues that the unique nature of climate-related conflicts, spanning intergenerational equity, state-corporate liability, and transnational enforcement necessitatesspecially enacted arbitration rulesto ensure procedural fairness, technical expertise, and enforceability. Through a comparative analysis of general arbitralrules(e.g. ICC, UNCITRAL,LCIA, etc.) and emerging specialised frameworks (e.g. PCA’s 2021 Rules on Climate Disputes, ICSID’s sustainability provisions, etc.), this article underscores the need for the arbitration community to focus on efficientresolution of climate change disputes. Key findings reveal that general rules often fall short in addressing crucial aspects such as appointment of climate change experts (as arbitrators and witnesses), precision in awarding interim reliefs, importance of transparency in such matters, scientific evidentiary standards, and third-party participation aligned with climate justice. The article assists the parties to decide whether they should go for general rules or tailored rules for arbitration based on the complexity of their contract and a dispute that may involve climate change aspects. It further highlights institutional efforts in developing climate focused arbitral rule, analysing the presence of key aspects necessary in for efficient resolution of climate change disputes: (1)specialised tribunals with climate expertise; (2)streamlined proceduresfor urgent interim measure; and (3) option for third party joinders in such complex matters.