The recently introduced three amendment bills – referred to the Joint Parliamentary committee – proposing the disqualification of ministers detained beyond 30 days for offences with a minimum five-year sentence have invoked much debate and scrutiny. They have been criticised for their potential to destabilise opposition ruled state governments and encourage defections. However, missing from the conversation is how certain Union Territories continue to remain awkward appendages of Indian federalism, rather than equal participants. Their position in the Indian federal scheme seems to remain unequal to the states, and the survival and design of their legislative assemblies continue to be open to repeal or amendment by way of a simple parliamentary majority. Against this backdrop, the recourse, we argue, is the introduction of the doctrine of constitutional statutes in India, a conversation that remains largely confined to those researching constitutional law in the legal academia. These three bills make this doctrine indispensable to protecting our federalism and democracy.