Cross-border acquisitions by emerging market firms have been increasing at an accelerated pace. The present study examines the impact of cross-border acquisition on the earnings manipulation of emerging market firms by analyzing the cross-border deals from India during the period 2000–2015. Using two proxies for earnings management, we find that cross-border acquisition reduces the incentive to manipulate earnings by way of accruals, but not via real economic transactions. Further, cross-sectional tests reveal that the incentive to reduce accrual earnings manipulation is more pronounced when the acquisition is made in countries with a strong corporate governance structure. Additional analysis indicates that acquisition results in increased earnings response coefficient for the acquirer firms relative to the control firms. Our finding is robust even after controlling for cross-listing and endogeneity associated with cross-border acquisition decision. The results have implications for the literature on the spillover of financial reporting practices across countries due to cross-border business activities, especially in the context of emerging markets, which are known for their weak investor protection and underdeveloped institutional environment.