A tale of two harts: the paradox in essays on Bentham

Swaminathan, Shivprasad (2017) A tale of two harts: the paradox in essays on Bentham. Legal Theory, 23 (1). pp. 27-54. ISSN 13523252

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This paper hypothesizes that the paradox Hart confesses to in Ch. X of Essays on Bentham was the result of metaethical ambivalence. Hart eclectically yokes together metaethically incompatible elements from two disparate models of “normativity of law” with different sources of normativity: the impinging model based on a cognitivist metaethic and the projectivist model based on a noncognitivist metaethic. The “sources” of normativity in the two models are different. On the impinging model the source of normativity is a reason-giving objective moral requirement, and on the projectivist model, the source of normativity is a motivationally affective conative attitude. The metaethical configuration of the rule of recognition in Essays on Bentham constrained Hart to postulate a “source” of normativity metaethically congruous with the impinging model. However, the “source” of normativity Hart seemed keen to advance—he makes an “attitude” the source of normativity—was only congruous with the projectivist model.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Bentham | Cognitivist Metaethic | Projectivist Mode
Subjects: Social Sciences and humanities > Social Sciences > Law and Legal Studies
JGU School/Centre: Jindal Global Law School
Depositing User: Amees Mohammad
Date Deposited: 27 Jan 2022 09:27
Last Modified: 14 Feb 2022 07:19
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325217000131
URI: https://pure.jgu.edu.in/id/eprint/899


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