All parliaments of the world besides requiring certain general qualifications, regard specific class of persons as ineligible usually because the posts that they hold or intend to hold are termed to be incompatible with the noble purpose of the office of a legislator. Over period of time, specified set of qualifications and disqualifications have been become an inherent part of the law for selection of the legislators of any democratic nation. These requisite conditions of eligibility reflect a legitimate concern of the people to select suitable candidates by a way of election. In any modern welfare democratic state, independence of the legislators needs constitutional safeguards. The challenge is to determine the extent of the ineligibility. It was felt that the ineligibility relating to the holding of an office other than that of Member of Parliament/Legislature should constitute a legal bar to membership. This is because a legislator should be independent and be able to work without any influence and prejudice. He should be free of any control of the executive government. If the executive government were to have untrammelled powers of offering a legislator any appointment, position or office which carries emoluments or allowances of one kind or the other with it, there would be a risk that an individual member might feel himself beholden to the executive and thus lose his independence of thought and action and cease to be a true representative of his constituents.
This research aims at attempting to analyse multi-faceted dimensions of the obscure law relating to disqualification for holding office of profit. A reflection of the jurisprudence of office of profit is also seen in statutory provisions that provide for disqualification for holding contractual relationships with the government. This research will also make an attempt to examine the contrast in the growth of these two similarly aimed provisions.