Critiquing Insider Trading’s Presumption of Guilt Model: The fallacy of not examining mens rea

Khandelwal, Tanmay (2022) Critiquing Insider Trading’s Presumption of Guilt Model: The fallacy of not examining mens rea. Tax Guru complete Tax Solution.

[thumbnail of Critiquing Insider Trading’s Presumption of Guilt Model_ The fallacy of not examining mens rea- taxguru.in.pdf] Text
Critiquing Insider Trading’s Presumption of Guilt Model_ The fallacy of not examining mens rea- taxguru.in.pdf - Published Version

Download (91kB)

Abstract

Insider Trading has been argued to be unjust and based in opportunism.[1] It has also been argued that although
insider trading may be unjust,[2] it cannot be considered to be fraud.[3] Nevertheless, it is easily observable how
insider trading puts the unassuming shareholder at a disadvantage to the director, or anybody else, who might
use the company’s Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (“UPSI”) to trade and make a profit that otherwise
would not have been accessible to them. On the basis of, inter alia, the activity’s ethical immorality, the P.J.
Thomas Committee Report[4] suggested criminal and civil liabilities for insider trading in India. These
suggestions were incorporated, although in a tokenistic manner, in the Companies Act, 1956[5] wherein directors
were obligated to disclose their shareholdings in the company. These obligations were then translated into
Section 184 of the Companies Act, 2013 which states that “Every director shall … disclose his concern or
interest in any company … which shall include the shareholding

Item Type: Article in News Papers and Magazine
Subjects: Social Sciences and humanities > Social Sciences > Law and Legal Studies
JGU School/Centre: Jindal Global Law School
Depositing User: Amees Mohammad
Date Deposited: 18 Aug 2022 07:19
Last Modified: 18 Aug 2022 07:19
Official URL: https://taxguru.in/sebi/critiquing-insider-trading...
URI: https://pure.jgu.edu.in/id/eprint/4243

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item