Controlled Semi-Presidentialism: The Case for Semi-Presidentialism under the Indian Constitution

Gautam, Khagesh (2015) Controlled Semi-Presidentialism: The Case for Semi-Presidentialism under the Indian Constitution. Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 29 (1). pp. 179-254. ISSN 1094-8449

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Abstract

In the 67 years since the people of India adopted, enacted, and gave to themselves their Constitution, a proposition of constitutional law in relation to the office of the President of the Indian Republic has come to be widely accepted. This accepted proposition, based on the authority of the judicial precedents of the Supreme Court of India, is that the Indian President is only a titular head of the executive branch and does not possess any actual executive powers.' Instead, it is the Council of Ministers (or the Union Cabinet), that exercises real executive power in India, thus making the office of the Prime Minister of India the place where the proverbial buck stops and not the office of the President of India.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Semi-presidentialism | Indian Constitution
Subjects: Social Sciences and humanities > Social Sciences > Law and Legal Studies
JGU School/Centre: Jindal Global Law School
Depositing User: Amees Mohammad
Date Deposited: 12 Jun 2022 10:28
Last Modified: 13 Jun 2022 06:42
URI: https://pure.jgu.edu.in/id/eprint/3363

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