An infinitely farsighted stable set

Chander, Parkash (2015) An infinitely farsighted stable set. [Working papers (or Preprints)] (Unpublished)

[thumbnail of Chander2015.pdf] Text
Chander2015.pdf - Published Version

Download (296kB)


In this paper, we first introduce and characterize a new and general concept of a credible deviation in which a coalition may not only deviate from a deviant coalition, but may also merge with some residual players. Thus objections are not necessarily nested in the sense of coming from subsets of progressively smaller coalitions. We then motivate and introduce an infinitely farsighted stable set which is not amenable to similar criticisms as a traditional von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set or a Harsanyi stable set. After noting its general properties, we prove existence and characterize infinitely farsighted stable sets for general three-player superadditive characteristic function games with empty or nonempty cores as well as for convex games with any number of players.

Item Type: Working papers (or Preprints)
Keywords: Stable set | Neumann-Morgenstern stable set
Subjects: Social Sciences and humanities > Economics, Econometrics and Finance > Econometrics
JGU School/Centre: Jindal School of Government and Public Policy
Depositing User: Gena Veineithem
Date Deposited: 11 Jun 2022 06:40
Last Modified: 11 Jun 2022 11:42
Official URL:


Downloads per month over past year

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item