Does payout policy affect firms’ performance? Evidence from textile Industry in India

Sangwan, Vikas ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7547-3406 and Kushwaha, Shivam (2021) Does payout policy affect firms’ performance? Evidence from textile Industry in India. In: International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Operations Management, August 2-5, 2021, Rome, Italy. Available at: http://ieomsociety.org/proceedings/2021rome/172.pd...

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Abstract

This paper made an inquiry to whether dividend-paying firms are more efficient compared to their non-dividend paying counterparts. To achieve the same, we have employed a non-parametric frontier estimation technique, data envelopment analysis (DEA), on the selected dataset of 73 firms from the textile industry in India. Our result shows that non-dividend-paying firms are 11.17% less efficient in their performance compared to dividend-paying firms. Further analysis indicates that efficient firms have better corporate governance compared to inefficient nondividend-paying firms. Furthermore, the non-parametric test “ Kruskal-Wallis” reveals that there is a significant difference of about 5.15 % between “high corporate governance dividend paying firms” compared to “low corporate governance non-dividend paying firms”.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Payout policy | Firm performance | Data envelopment analysis | DEA | Corporate governance
Subjects: Social Sciences and humanities > Business, Management and Accounting > General Management
Social Sciences and humanities > Business, Management and Accounting > Industrial relations
Divisions: Jindal Global Business School
Depositing User: Mr. Syed Anas Ali
Date Deposited: 12 Mar 2022 07:26
Last Modified: 16 Sep 2026 04:26
Official URL: http://ieomsociety.org/proceedings/2021rome/172.pd...
URI: https://pure.jgu.edu.in/id/eprint/1564

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