Delay discourses contemplate both timely justice and delayed justice. The narrative on court delays so far has developed reflects a complete absence of any functional relevance of delay in the justice delivery system. This study shows that the temporal character of judicial review, tempered as a form of power, when utilised constructively in the justice delivery system produces delay-induced interim / final judicial outcomes resulting in rendering of justice partially or wholly bereft of law. Court delays is functionally relevant for the stakeholders who employ it to seek and grant justice. In Foucauldian terms, court delays act as a ‘power’ to influence the judgment (knowledge) resulting in what is treated as justice (truth) on account of delays. There have been debates and discussions on court delays over the past 100 years with reformatory measures being taken but considering its functional utility, the cycle of ‘power’ (court delays) and ‘knowledge’ (judicial outcomes / precedents) resulting in ‘truth’ (justice) is rarely interrupted. Court delays have thus transformed from a ‘cause of concern’ to a ‘cause of action’. For a democratic society governed by a written Constitution, justice which legitimises a ‘rule of court delays’ rather than a ‘rule of law’ cannot assume a normative character. This legitimisation ought to be consciously transposed both by the justice-seeker and the justicegiver.