This doctoral thesis identifies three facets of judicial behaviour of the Supreme Court of India that call for an explanation: firstly, the shifting contours of relationship between the Supreme Court of India and other organs of the government in the backdrop of constitutional arrangement envisaged in the Constitution of India; secondly, how the Supreme Court of India goes about deciding cases and laying down law, with the emphasis here being on the ostensible unpredictability of the Court; and lastly, the behaviour of the Chief Justice of India in administrative matters, that includes constituting benches and allocating cases to them, which further adds to the unpredictability noted earlier. The thesis then seeks to account for factors that guide or regulate the actions of the judiciary in the above areas by drawing upon the resources of analytical legal theory. It seeks to construct a model of judicial behaviour that can explain why the facets of judicial behaviour of the Supreme Court of India identified here take the shape that they do.