The accord and satisfaction doctrine permits contractual obligations to be extinguished through mutually agreed substitute performance. Yet its intersection with commercial arbitration reveals a procedural vulnerability: purported settlements are weaponized as jurisdictional shields to oust arbitral tribunals and extinguish a claimant’s access to their chosen forum. This paper argues that this misuse rests on a doctrinal misclassification. Objections grounded in accord and satisfaction, particularly where settlements are contested on grounds of coercion or unequal bargaining power, are not jurisdictional but go to admissibility. This distinction, reinforced by the separability and competence-competence doctrines, ensures tribunals rather than courts evaluate the voluntariness of contested settlements. Building on this framework, the paper develops a contextual standard of proof, resolves the tripartite choice-of-law conflict between the lex contractus, settlement law, and lex arbitri, and offers concrete drafting templates for practitioners. The result is a principled framework protecting arbitral integrity without destabilizing legitimate commercial settlements.