Care is a form of labour and a value that is enjoyed by everyone, but have we cared enough about ‘care’ as a legal concept? In India, the idea of ‘care’ has primarily been housed in philosophy and gender studies, and has only been engaged with to a certain extent in some strands of legal theory. This has restricted the usage of, and analytical insights from, the concept of ‘ethics of care’ vis-à-vis the Constitution, and legal jurisprudence more broadly. In this article, we interrogate the silence in the Indian Constitution about the concept of care, and also highlight the forms through which the concept of care can be constitutionally addressed and duly incorporated.

The article begins by tracing the notion of ‘care’ in Indian legal and judicial traditions, critically examining how jurisprudence has engaged with care-related concerns in diverse areas such as family, health, environmental protection, and labour law. The article then evaluates whether the constitutional discourse treats care as a coherent normative value or whether its invocation remains sporadic, inconsistent, or instrumental. Moving from description to normativity, the second section argues for a deeper constitutional anchoring of care, drawing from philosophy, feminism and comparative legal doctrine. It warns of the consequential risks of excessive state paternalism disguised as care, while emphasising upon the potential of care to guide responsive and equitable state action. The final section reimagines the architecture of constitutional rights and suggests ways to integrate the ethics of care within existing doctrinal frameworks by exploring the interplay between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. Engaging with Sandra Fredman’s argument on envisioning care as a constitutional value, the article goes a step further and argues for reconceptualising care not merely as a moral aspiration but as a precept backed by constitutional force. It thus proposes care as a justiciable right that bridges the normative gaps in India’s rights jurisprudence and challenges the silence of the Constitution on affective and relational dimensions of care. The article finally concludes that a constitutional right to care ought to be located securely within the Constitution and not be left to the vagaries of the judicial system.