

TAIWAN-CHINA CONUNDRUM:
**WHAT CAN BE INDIA'S
POLICY TRAJECTORIES?**

Dr. Manoj Kumar Panigrahi

Taiwan-China Conundrum: What Can be India's Policy Trajectories?

By

Dr. Manoj Kumar Panigrahi

India Foundation

2023

Foreword

It has been my pleasure to know Dr Panigrahi for the last one year. His academic interest in Cross-Strait relations fascinated me. His plethora of writing on the political, economic and strategic issues of the Indo-Pacific region shows his keen interest in the subject and that makes it more significant while he works on Cross-Strait relations.

The author examines the Cross-Strait relations from various perspectives that include historical, contextual, political, security studies, regional perspectives etc. Cross-Strait relations have been challenging in the past. One China policy has always eroded Taiwan's identity and their feeling has never been recognised. Politically both the societies have distinct identities and the security of the region is complex. This complex nature of security and political economy creates space for the international community to participate in the political reality of the region. The role of great powers and regional powers have been discussed by the author.

An abundance of literature has been devoted to studying the international relations of the Indo-Pacific Region but Dr Panigrahi's work has a fresh look. A fresh look in term of it deviates from the traditional western lens which is used to explain the international politics of the region. During my mentorship of this work, I have found the author Dr Panigrahi has done justice to a great Bhartiya political thinker Kautilya who wrote treaties on politics around 326 BC. Kautilya, a perennial realist more revolutionary than Machiavelli and Hobbes in his great work Arthshastra says the Enemy's enemy is a friend. What exactly Dr Panigrahi try to explain the political reality of the region and suggest a realist foreign policy that India could possess vis a vis China and Taiwan.

In a nutshell, this work provides a fresh ideas. It would be of immense benefit to the student of the subject.

Ranvijay Singh, PhD

Associate Professor

Centre for International Politics Organisation and Disarmament

School of International Studies

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Acronyms

ADIZ	Air Defence Identification Zone
ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CSSTA	Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
ECFA	Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
EDCA	Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
ICSSR	Indian Council of Social Science Research
KMT	Kuomintang
MAC	Mainland Affairs Council
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
NUC	National Unification Council
NSP	New Southbound Policy
NSTC	National Science and Technological Council
OFW	Overseas Filipino Worker
PRC	People's Republic of China
PLAAF	People's Liberation Army Airforce
ROC	Republic of China
SCS	South China Sea
TEC	Taiwan Education Centre
TECC	Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre
TPOF	Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation
TPP	Taiwan's People's Party
WHA	World Health Assembly

Tables, Figures, and Maps

MAPS

1	Map of People’s Republic of China (PRC)	vii
2	Map of Republic of China (ROC)	viii

TABLES


1	A Typology of the <i>Taishang’s</i> Political Roles	12
2	Distribution of Scholarships provided by the Ministry of Education, Taiwan towards Indian Students	20

FIGURES

1	One China, Two Systems (PRC Version)	8
2	Conceptual Framework on Cross-Strait Peace and War	17

Map of People's Republic of China (PRC)

中国地图



Source: The State Council, The People's Republic of China

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/chinaabc/202303/29/content_WS6423ecc9c6d0f528699dc621.html

Map of Republic of China (ROC)



Source: Ministry of the Interior, ROC (Taiwan)

<https://www.land.moi.gov.tw/upload/d25-20220110113507.pdf>

Abstract

Out of the multiple potential flashpoint regions in the world, the relations between China (People's Republic of China-PRC) and Taiwan (Republic of China-ROC) are among them. Since the 1930s, Mao Zedong-led Maoist forces have been embroiled in a bitter civil war against the Chiang Kai-Shek-led ROC (Nationalist) forces under Kuomintang (KMT) party. The civil war saw the Nationalist defeat in mainland China, leading the Chiang Party to move to Taiwan in 1949. The move to Taiwan was made to set up the KMT base to fight against Mao's forces and hope to get back to the mainland. However, the dream of Chiang Kai-shek was unfulfilled. The changing geopolitical scenarios over the decades have led to the involvement of multiple significant powers in the cross-strait, primarily the United States and Japan, for strategic and historical reasons. On the sidelines of the issues in Cross-Strait, since May 2020 Galwan clash, where India lost its 20 soldiers in a fight with the Chinese army, there have been growing voices in India that the Indian government should abandon its "One China" policy. India's "One China" policy recognizes China as the sole representative of Mainland China while declining the existence of Taiwan. India's "Act East Policy" and Taiwan's "New Southbound Policy (NSP)" are termed as a perfect fit for each other, where both sides aim to broaden their relations beyond politics in their respective policies. India is anticipated as the next manufacturing base for the world and a leading economy in the forthcoming decades. To get investments in crucial technologies, Taiwan can become a crucial factor in India's

growth and play a significant role. It occurred when India and Taiwan faced increased Chinese assertiveness against themselves. The long-standing border dispute between India and China and the complicated cross-strait relations are the most significant factors for the growing ties. Given this backdrop, the monograph aims to understand the following points. First is the current state of Cross-Strait relations. Second, it wants to understand how the domestic perception in China and Taiwan, the Cross-Strait relations pans out. Third is the involvement of the international actors and how it shapes their policies to the Cross-Strait. Fourthly, it will reflect on India's position in the Cross-Strait, aiming to understand the trajectories of where India can play a role in the region. Finally, the monograph proposes tentative scenarios that India may find itself during a Cross-Strait conflict.

Key Words: India, Taiwan, China, Democracy, Act East

1. Introduction

The relations between China (People's Republic of China-PRC) and Taiwan (Republic of China-ROC) are one of the multiple potential flashpoint regions in the world. The relations between the two are also known as Cross-Strait relations, as both lie on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Since the 1930s, Mao Zedong-led Maoist forces have been embroiled in a bitter civil war against the Chiang Kai-Shek-led ROC (Nationalist) forces under Kuomintang (KMT) party. The civil war saw the Nationalist defeat in mainland China, leading the Chiang Party to move to Taiwan in 1949. The move to Taiwan was made to set up the KMT base to fight against Mao's forces and hope to get back to the mainland. However, the dream of Chiang Kai-shek was unfulfilled.

On the other hand, Mao ultimately attempted to defeat the ROC forces but was again left unsuccessful post their campaigns to take over the outlying islands of Kinmen in 1949. The defeat of Mao's forces led to a significant morale boost for the ROC forces. Since then, neither side of the conflicting parties managed to achieve their dreams, and the status quo has remained.

The changing geopolitical scenarios over the decades have led to the involvement of multiple powers in the Cross-Strait, primarily the United States and Japan, for strategic and historical reasons. With outside actors' involvement, the already complicated situation has embroiled within itself at a much larger scale. On the sidelines of the issues in Cross-Strait, since May 2020 Galwan clash where India lost its 20 soldiers in a fight with the Chinese army, there have been growing voices in India to abandon "One China" policy. India's "One China" policy recognizes China as the sole representative of Mainland China while declining the existence of Taiwan. The call to recognize Taiwan as an independent nation has only increased in India since the unfortunate Galwan clash.

India's "Act East Policy" and Taiwan's "New Southbound Policy (NSP)" are termed as a perfect fit for each other, where both sides aim to broaden their relations beyond politics. India is the largest country in Taiwan's NSP. Given its technical prowess in the semiconductor industry and other high-tech technologies, Taiwan has become a crucial factor to consider when considering the global supply chain of electronic goods. India is anticipated as the next manufacturing base for the world and a leading economy in the forthcoming decades. Taiwan can become a crucial factor in India's growth and play a significant role. It occurred when India and Taiwan faced increased Chinese assertiveness against themselves. The long-standing border dispute between India and China and the complicated Cross-Strait relations are the most significant factors for the growing ties.

Given this backdrop, the monograph aims to understand the following points. First is the historical past of the Cross-Strait relations. Second, it wants to understand how the domestic perception in China and Taiwan of the Cross-Strait relations pans out. Third is the involvement of the international actors and how it shapes their policies to the Cross-Strait. Fourth, it will reflect on India's position in the Cross-Strait, aiming to understand the trajectories of where India can play a role in the region. Finally, the monograph proposes tentative scenarios that India may find itself during a Cross-Strait conflict.

2) State of Cross-Strait Relationsⁱ

2.1 Historical Past: Early days until Japanese Colonisation

One of the earliest records available of a visit by a Chinese to Taiwan was by Wang Ta-yuan's *Tao-i chih-lueh* (1349) (Thompson,1963). The record mentioned the earliest settlement of mainland Chinese traders and fishermen in the Penghu Islands (one of the largest groups of islands on the western coast of Taiwan). However, there was no official record of settlement or political authority in Taiwan during this time. As

the coastal province of China, Fujian saw a rise in fishing activities. It led the Han people of Fujian province in China to start interacting with the people in Penghu.

Since the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) took control of the Mainland, the Ming emperor reversed the policies of his predecessors of having a seafaring population and curbed all the freedom to its people to trade via sea. The policy of "maritime exclusion" and "isolation" was self-implemented to monopolise the overseas trade. Scholars have interpreted the policy from two perspectives: The security-diplomacy concerns and Ming China's anti-commerce governing style (Siu, 2022, pp. 1-2). The self-imposed curbs by the Ming dynasty collapsed in 1550, after which maritime activity increased in the region. It led to the revival of Chinese fishing activity around Taiwan and the Penghu islands (John E. Wills, 1999, p. 86).

In 1557, Portuguese sailors passing through the Taiwan Strait uttered the word *Ilha Formosa!* (Beautiful Island). The inhabitant of this island was called "*Formosans*" (Beautiful People) (Beng, 2017, p. 8). It was not until 1604 that the Dutch first appeared in the Penghu Islands. Penghu was a strategic base for the Dutch, and not Taiwan mainland, as the former had less risk of being attacked by the Aborigines and creating trouble (John E. Wills, 1999, p. 90). It was only when commercial interest took over and the Taiwan mainland was seen as a source of revenue, that Dutch attempted to set up their base in Mainland Taiwan, beginning from the southern part of Taiwan. In 1624, the Dutch occupied T'a-yuen in the southwest of Taiwan (modern-day Tainan city-Anping area) (Beng, 2017, p. 9).

During the same period as Dutch, Spanish traders arrived in mainland Taiwan in 1626 at Keelung (the northeast port city of Taiwan) and Tamsui (the northwest port city of Taiwan) in 1629. Due to the convergence of the strategic aim of controlling the trade with China and Japan, several clashes occurred between the Dutch and the Spanish generals, leading to the Spanish being defeated and complete Dutch

control of the island from 1624 until 1661. Under the Dutch, several tax, land, and trade reforms occurred, encouraging migration from Mainland China to Taiwan in the more considerable hope of a "*Taiwan Dream*".

The Dutch rule over Taiwan ended abruptly when the Ming dynasty loyalist Cheng Cheng-kungⁱⁱ led an army against the European colonisers in 1661. It was then for the first time anyone from Mainland took control of Taiwan but only briefly. However, Koxinga's rule over Taiwan was short-lived due to his untimely death in 1662. He was succeeded by his son Cheng Ching. In 1681, Cheng Ching died; his son Cheng Ke-shuang was not a strong ruler, and he surrendered to Qing Emperor General Shih Lang.

Both dynastic rulers saw the immigrants to Taiwan as traitors, bandits, or hoodlums. After controlling Taiwan, the Qing emperor followed his predecessor by banning immigration. The Qing ruler proclaimed several strict rules to stop the engagement between the Han and the natives/immigrants of Taiwan. One such was the "Regulations for the Investigation of Movement to Taiwan" (Beng, 2017, pp. 28-29). Though the restrictions were present under Ming and Qing rule of China, the immigrations never stopped aiming to come to Taiwan. Appendix 1 depicts the rise of immigration from China's Fujian and Guangdong majorly.

In 1895, at the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the Qing Empire ceded Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, leading to the third colonisation of the island. Moreover, the new ruler of the island set a two-year period in which all Taiwanese had to become Japanese nationalsⁱⁱⁱ (Ibid. P. 30). Japan's rule over Taiwan ended with the former's surrender to the Allies unconditionally in 1945. Taiwan returned to China, then under the Chiang Kai-shek-led Nationalist party known as Kuomintang (KMT).

2.2 Post-World War II: Civil War and shifting of ROC Government to Taipei

In 1945, post Japan surrendering its claim over Taiwan it signed a peace deal with ROC known as “Treaty of Taipei” on 28 April, 1952. The treaty clearly and overtly mentions the agreement between the Government of ROC and the Government of Japan (UN, 1952, p. 38). The Japanese surrender came as a piece of brighter news to people in Taiwan. However, the long colonial legacy became a double-edged sword. Taiwanese had to legitimise their affiliation with China and prove they were not "Japanised" and did not collaborate with the colonial power (Philips, 2007, p. 276).

Since the 1930s, Mao Zedong-led Maoist forces have been embroiled in a bitter civil war against the Chiang Kai-shek-led Nationalist^{iv} forces under the KMT^v party. The Chinese civil war saw the Nationalist defeat in mainland China, leading the Chiang Party to move to Taiwan in 1949 with his followers. KMT's move to Taiwan made the island the base to fight against the Communist Mao's forces and hope to return to the Mainland. Along with the tensions in the Cross-Strait, other geopolitical tensions were occurring in the region. Korean War (1950-1953), Vietnam War (1955-1975), and Cold War (post World War II) daunted the Cross-Strait tensions parallelly since 1949.

Nevertheless, there were multiple attempts by the newly formed PRC forces led by Mao Zedong to occupy the ROC controlled offshore islands. In 1948, the outlying islands of Kinmen^{vi} and Matsu faced multiple military takeover attempts. In October 1949, PRC attempted an amphibious assault and takeover of Kinmen Island. The ROC forces repulsed the attack, which led to a significant pause in cross-strait military activities (Yu, 2016, p. 92).

Though there was a pause in significant military actions against each other, small-scale, localised attacks continued. Actions such as

commando-style raids, infiltration, and loudspeaker propaganda regularly occurred, keeping the military on alert.

The attack on Kinmen began on 23 August 1958 with concentric and fierce artillery bombings. The artillery barrage was done on alternate days, known as "odd-even day bombings" (M.H.Halperin, 1966, p. 101). The bombings continued until the US recognised China as a country and established diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ruled China by de-recognising Taiwan under ROC. One can understand the severity of the situation by looking at the total number of missiles fired (See Appendix 2)^{vii}.

The Strait saw several other significant military flare-ups on three-different occasions, starting in 1955, 1958, and 1996. The three military flare-up were termed "First, Second, and Third Missile Crisis". Post-1996, there was a brief pause on more extensive military action against Taiwan by China. However, it re-started on an August 2022 visit by Nancy Pelosi, the US House of Representatives Speaker, bringing the Chinese missiles closer to the Taiwan mainland (Wei, 2022). What raised eyebrows among analysts was that some of the missiles fired landed in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZs) near Okinawa Island, a significant military base stationed by US forces (Nemoto & Miki, 2022). The missiles fired were touted as the "fourth missile crisis" across the Cross-Strait. This was the first time, the missiles also flew over the Taiwan's Mainland. With missiles falling in Japan's EEZ, it also calls for understanding and studying neighbouring country's policies towards a Cross-Strait escalation.

As per the data collected from the Ministry of National Defense, ROC, and other reports, there has been a rising number of Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) incursions by the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF); from August 2015 to December 2017, there were 26 ADIZ incursions, 638 in 2018, 675 in 2019, 380 in 2020, 969 in 2021, and 370 until 6 May 2022 (ROCMND, 2022). The visit led to a

new trend militarily: the "closure of air and water space" around some areas of Taiwan mainland.

Live fire exercises by China continued again when President Tsai Ing-wen met Nancy Pelosi's successor Kevin McCarthy during her "transit stop" at the US on her way to Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Central America. The set of "blockade" was again evident once President Tsai returned to Taiwan. The northern Taiwan air route was closed for 27 minutes instead of 3 days earlier, as first announced by the Chinese military (Shan, 2023). The reduction of the blockade timeline reflects a Track 2 discussion being active between the straits.

The Chinese policy towards Taiwan in the first 30 years was aimed at decoupling Taiwan from the protection of US and its allies, and to achieve this it took a rigid military approach which involved military adventures by CCP to take over Kinmen, an Matsu offshore islands in 1949 and followed by bombings in 1958. A *Xinhua* editorial of 15 March 1949, titled "*Zhongguo renmin yiding yao jiefang Taiwan*" [the Chinese people certainly will liberate Taiwan], was published reflecting the official stance of the PRC (Wachman, 2008, p. 3). Followed by the first missile crisis in 1955 and in 1958, the artillery bombardment of Kinmen continued until China was officially recognised as mainland China's sole representative in December 1978. The bombings occurred on odd calendar days, marking a nickname of "Odd-Even bombings".

In 1971, United Nations (UN) passed resolution No. 2758, which specifically talked about the status of the PRC over the mainland China expelling ROC. The resolution said:

The General Assembly, Decides to restore all its rights to the PRC and to recognise the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the UN and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the UN and in all the organisations related to it (UNGA, 1971).

However, the PRC under CCP claims it also means Taiwan is an unalienable part of China, contradictory to the UN resolution that does not mention Taiwan's status. Post 1979 until 1995, China went with a softer approach post-recognition by the US, emphasising "peaceful unification". Furthermore, post-1995, President Lee Teng Hui's speech at Cornell University began with the "*Carrots and Sticks*" approach. In his speech at Cornell, President Lee mentioned, "two nations" referring to Taiwan and China as two separate countries (Teng-Hui, 1995). Such a statement angered China leading to a missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait.

Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, and since then, the policy of the PRC has been more multi-dimensional. At one point PRC came out with a softer approach, but also did not miss to sanction ("punish" used by PRC) those who did not abide by the PRC version of the "One China" policy.

The KMT had an iron-clad rule from 1949 until 1987 in Taiwan. Martial Law, popularly known as the "White Terror", was declared in this period. Until President Chiang Chin-kuo (1988) was alive, the idea was to get back to the motherland (China). President Chiang Ching-kuo adopted a "3 No Policy" [No Contact, No Negotiation, and No Compromise] towards China. He expressed anger and declared the "short notice" given by the US regarding its decision to shift ties from ROC to PRC as "inconceivable" (Hsiung, 2000, p. 117).

However, post 1988, under President Lee Teng-hui, the identity formation gradually changed from Chinese to Taiwanese. After Taiwan removed the Martial Law, it established National Unification Council (NUC) in 1990, which set up a set of guidelines on Taiwan's policy towards the Mainland (FCJ, 1990). Later in 2000, the NUC was abandoned by the successor of Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)^{viii}. For the first time in Taiwanese history there was a peaceful transition of power from KMT to another

party after 55 years of continuous rule. The DPP has always been a pro-independence leaning party which saw its formulation in the 1980s.

Chen Shui-bian, in his inaugural speech as President, pledged the "Four Noes and One Without" (Shui-bian, 2000). In his book, he shared his idea of Cross-Strait relations, it meant that as long as the PRC had no intention to use military force against Taiwan, he would not declare independence nor change the national symbols of the ROC.

Chen Shui-bian was succeeded by Ma Ying-Jeou in 2008 from KMT. Born in Hong Kong, President Ma's tenure was full of controversies, given his closeness to Beijing. Soon after his tenure began in May 2008, Chen Yunlin (陈云林), the then-chairman of China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), visited Taipei in November 2008. It led to a massive protest known as the "Wild Strawberries Movement". This marked the beginning of the anti-KMT protests in Taiwan. Chen's visit was primarily to facilitate the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between Taiwan and China (Cole, 2017, p. 20). The ECFA, which aimed to bring the economics of Taiwan and China closer by reducing tariffs, led to the signing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in 2013. The Taiwanese youth saw this as a pro-China move, and the main opposition party DPP took advantage of it by painting KMT as pro-China.

The CSSTA led to the "Sunflower Movement" in Taiwan in 2014, where the protestors, mostly the youth, occupied the Legislative Yuan^{ix} for 23 days. It led to the withdrawal of CSSTA and became one of the prime actors where the message was sent across the strait to China that the Taiwanese youth do not associate themselves mainly with China. Such agreements also led to KMT's fall in the 2016 national election.

2.3 The Politics of White Paper

The three decades (1949-1979) reflect a mutual will from both Taiwan and the Chinese to get back to each other. Taiwan, under the KMT-led ROC government aimed to get back to motherland (mainland China), whereas the CCP aimed to bring Taiwan and its offshore islands under its territory.

China has also released consecutively three white papers over time. The first white paper was released on 31 August 1993 and titled "PRC White Paper, "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China" (TaiwanAffairsOffice, 1993). It followed the "1992 Consensus" and described the Cross-Strait policy regarding Chinese views. In its first section, the white paper titled "Taiwan: An Inalienable Part of China" mentions, "*Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times*" (TaiwanAffairsOffice, 1999, p. 78) The white paper also defended the claims by the PRC on Taiwan and blamed the KMT for its mishandling and internationalising domestic issue. The internationalisation has led to the involvement of the US as the net security provider to Taiwan in case there is a change in the status quo of the Cross-Strait by using force.

As the white paper states, "The Chinese people on both sides of the strait all believe that there is only one China and espouse national reunification" (TaiwanAffairsOffice, 1999, p. 86). the paper also explained the "1992 Consensus" regarding China's viewpoint. First, it reiterates that there is one China in the world, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Second, it defends the co-existence of two types of economic systems: the socialism of China and the capitalism of Taiwan. Third, it promises a higher degree of autonomy, where Taiwan will become a particular representative region with administrative and legislative powers. Moreover, fourth, it stated a provision for peace negotiations.

However, the former Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) chairman of Taiwan, Su Chi, stated that the term "1992 Consensus" was a term made up in 2000, and it was not until the 2001 legislative election that the then KMT chairman in 2001 Lien Chan began emphasising it. Beijing repeatedly denounced the term until 2005 when it accepted the "1992 Consensus" during Lien's visit to China (Jacobs, 2016). The statement by MAC Chairman needs further analysis in light of the question that if Beijing had not agreed to use the "1992 Consensus" terminology, then why was it mentioned in its First white paper in 1993?

The second white paper was released on 21 February 2000 (TaiwanAffairsOffice, 2000). The paper targeted KMT's leader and then President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui. President Lee has been known for his reformist ideas within KMT; in a speech at his alma mater at Cornell University, he stated, "state-to-state relations", referring to cross-strait relations. Additionally, in his book published in May 1999, *The Road to Democracy*, he advocated the division of China into seven "fully autonomous" regions. Such reformist ideas were not received well by China (TaiwanAffairsOffice, 2000, pp. 45-46).

In the same white paper, China blamed Japan for its improper colonial rule over Taiwan and the agreements which followed post-Japan's surrender. The paper also blamed how the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed in April 1895, which forced the Qing government in China to allow Japan's role over Taiwan. The official report also mentioned China's President Deng Xiaoping's "One Country, two systems" approach and President Jiang Zemin's eight propositions, bringing their ideas from adhering to China's version of the "One China principle". The paper again referred to the Taiwanese as fellow "compatriots" of China. This paper introduced the policies on how China is going to protect the Taiwanese economic interests and also its citizens who are

abroad. It mentioned how the Chinese Government assisted the Taiwanese in evacuating from Kuwait during the Gulf War and provided relief and safe evacuation post-earthquake in Japan.


The third white paper was released on 10 August 2022 (TaiwanAffairsOffice, 2022); China published its third white paper. The latest white paper deleted a pledge in the first and second white papers. The pledge said that China would allow Taiwan to retain its military forces after its unification with Taiwan. Moreover, it said Beijing would refrain from dispatching Chinese military forces to Taiwan (Orita, 2023). The paper came out with new concepts of President Xi Jinping on handling Cross-Strait relations. It defended why Taiwan has been removed from the World Health Assembly (WHA), an increase of countries recognising China based on the One-China principle. The paper also revisited the earlier arguments by the CPC Central Committee on the claim that Taiwan is a part of China. Interestingly, the paper also delved into the domestic issues of Taiwan. For example, it mentioned water delivery from Fujian to Kinmen Island, cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic, and supporting Taiwanese compatriots.

The fourth section of the latest white paper was titled "National Reunification in the New Era". The CCP defended and explained the one country and two systems in this section.

One country is the precondition and foundation of Two Systems; Two Systems are subordinate to and derive from One country, and the two are integrated under the one-China principle (TaiwanAffairsOffice, 2022, p. 9).

The above CCP version of the claim can be understood as per Figure 1 below:

Figure 1: One China, Two Systems (PRC Version)



Source: Designed by the author

Beyond the military rhetoric, there are multiple other variables that play a crucial role in the shaping of Cross-Strait Relations. Trade relations, people's movements, identity shaping, disinformation campaigns, and external factors such as US and Japan's policies have been crucial in shaping and steering Cross-Strait relations. However, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong's dreams have remained unfulfilled.

In 2016, Taiwan started a refurbished New Southbound Policy (NSP) aiming to increase people-to-people connections with 18 countries.^x Among the NSP countries, India is the only other country which has a land boundary dispute with China and has the potential to be the world's next production house. To study and understand what can be India's response to the Cross-Strait crisis, one needs to understand how the domestic factors of Taiwan and the international actors shape the complex relationship.

In the next section, the monograph will delve into how the domestic perception in Taiwan and China plays a role in shaping the Cross-Strait relations in terms of political, business, public and security aspects.

3) Taiwan's Perception of the Cross-Strait Relations

The perspective of people living in Taiwan towards Cross-Strait relations needs to be studied in depth. The perception of people in Taiwan and China towards each other has been contested. Whereas the people in Taiwan identify themselves mostly as "Taiwanese" who share the same Chinese culture, contrary to it, the people of China consider the Taiwanese as fellow "compatriots" (as evident in the PRC's white papers discussed in Section One).

This section will analyse the domestic trends primarily in Taiwan and how they shape the nation's perception of China from 2016 since President Tsai Ing-wen took power. To analyse it will delve into politics, business, security, and public views.

3.1 Political

Tsai Ing-wen took the position of Presidentship in 2016 and was also re-elected in 2020. Her coming to power as the first female leader ushered in a new sense of energy among the Taiwanese. She was seen as someone who brought fresh perspectives and outlook to domestic and national issues.

Domestic problems such as low salary (Tzu-yu & Huang, 2022), land reforms (Waksman, 2022), and overburdened health insurance (Rickards, 2019) were some of the critical issues that mired her leadership time. National issues such as the security of Taiwan, an increasingly assertive China rose mainly in the first tenure, safe dealing

of loss of diplomatic allies^{xi}, Nancy Pelosi's visit, and the loss in domestic 9-in-1^{xii} elections in both terms. Whereas in her second term COVID-19 and the rise of Taiwan's People's Party (TPP) in domestic elections mired majorly as of this writing.

The political aspect of Cross-Strait relations can be seen in several elements of Taiwan's politics. To analyse the situation, we need to see the approaches adopted by President Tsai during her two terms as President of Taiwan^{xiii}. During her election campaign for the 2016 presidential election, Tsai, in an interview with *Washington Post*, denounced the "1992 Consensus", drawing fire from Beijing (Weymouth, 2016). It affected the existing hotline between the two sides (Lee, Wu, & Torode, 2022) and led to a slow but steady loss of diplomatic allies.

Another significant change that occurred during President Tsai's rule is the rise of "Taiwanization" in her policies. One such example can be seen in "redesigning the passport", where the words "Republic of China" was made into a smaller font size compared to the word "Taiwan". Though this was welcomed by the Taiwanese citizens and supporters of Taiwan, on the ground, it did not change any reality. It can be said that the move was somewhat similar to Chen shui-bian's adding the name Taiwan to the ROC passport holders.

In the DPP itself, there are "deep green" and "light green" factions which primarily shows how deeply they support the independence idea of Taiwan. In an online response to the query on whether DPP has any factions, Courtney Donovan Smith, a Taiwan-based political commentator said:

The 正常國家促進會 or Taiwan Normal Country Promotion Association (TNCPA-usually abbreviated as 正國會) is nominally for what its name suggests. In reality, the DPP factions are more about people and power than ideology, including the TNCPA, which was largely formed out of

the old You Faction: You Si-kun (游錫堃) that formed out of his power base when he was premier.

Such differences are natural within a party formed during the last days of martial law. With the changing geopolitical realities, DPP under President Tsai has maintained its strong opposition to recognising the “1992 Consensus”, but it is also wary of declaring self-independence and continues to maintain the status quo.

The main opposition party KMT has evolved from a Nationalist ROC party which aimed to get back to the motherland (Mainland China) to a party which aims for greater cooperation and contacts with Mainland China. However, the changing realities of Taiwan's political and ethnic identities have made KMT to evolve itself in large way. It was quite evident when the current KMT chairman Eric Chu, visited US and reassured that the party always has been “pro-US”. (Chen K. , 2022)

But as complicated as it can get, within KMT there are multiple factions to be studied. An in-depth analysis has been conducted by Courtney Donovan Smith (Smith, 2022). Johnny Chiang (江啟臣), former KMT Chairman, who is considered as moderate or light blue, wants to drop the 1992 Consensus and has been less aggressive when it comes to talking anti-China. Whereas the deep blue KMT can be seen as two internal factions themselves. The President of the KMT's Sun Yat-sen School, Chang Ya-chung and former chairman Hung Hsiu-chu are those who want to move to quickly unify with China, whereas former President Ma would like to slowly, but gradually, integrate with China by setting up the stage for unification.

In both the 2018 and 2022 domestic elections, popularly known as “9-in-1” elections, KMT has been victorious against DPP, though it still struggles to gain the confidence of the larger public on its soft approach towards PRC. The public also raised its voices against the KMT leader

who visited China post the military drills conducted by the PLA in August 2022, and April 2023.

There is a new political party which has emerged since 2019 - the TPP. Led by former Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je,^{xiv} the TPP has been the black horse in the ever-interesting domestic politics of Taiwan. Popularly known as “Ko P”, he formed TPP on 6 August 2019 intending to provide a third alternative to the Taiwan’s public. One quick look at TPP’s homepage on the internet provides an overview of its core values. The values do not mention ROC reflecting a change in how political participation matches with people’s aspirations.

TPP won a seat in Hsinchu in the 2022 local mayoral election, which has traditionally been the strong point of KMT (2005-2014 by KMT, 2014-2020 by DPP). With the upcoming Presidential elections 2024, TPP will indeed play the “third option” for the Taiwanese voting-age population.

Foreign interference with the rise in digitisation will be the next challenge for the elections in Taiwan. There has been an increase in Chinese interference in local issues and elections in Taiwan. The risk of interference was found when KMT Han Kuo-yu Mayoral candidate for Kaohsiung City in the south, was accused of accepting donations of 20 million USD from China by Wang “William” Liqiang (Charlier, 2019).

Han Kuo-yu^{xv} came to power on 25 December 2018, promising a more incredible economic growth and prosperity, and he was the presidential candidate for the KMT in 2020. As per Wang’s comments, he helped guide positive media attention towards Kuo-yu. In an interview to Australia’s Channel 9 “60 Minutes” program, Wang claimed, “Taiwan was the most important work of ours: the infiltration into media, temples, and grassroots organisations” (60Minutes, 2019).

A separate in-depth analysis is required to study the internal dynamics of the political parties of Taiwan - the DPP, the KMT, and now the new emerging TPP.

2.2 Economy

Taiwan's economic development began under Japan with the industrialisation of sugar and camphor production. Later under KMT, it was the support from the US which was crucial for Taiwan. In 1961, Taiwan's top economic official, KY Yin, described US aid in the early 1850s as a "a shot of stimulant to a dying patient" (Rigger, 2021, p. 19). Due to the massive growth of the Taiwanese economy, it was also called "One of the Asian Tigers".

The first development phase of Taiwan's economy began with land reform in 1949, which ultimately led to high agricultural production and later industrial production with high economic gains. As the monograph focuses on Cross-Strait relations, this sub-section will analyse the Cross-Strait economic parameters.

In 1979 the Chinese government released a "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" proposing an opening of trade and economic exchanges. Later, the Chinese State Council passed the "Special Preferential Regulations on Taiwanese Patriot's Investment in the Special Economic Zones" to make it easier for Taiwanese businessmen to invest in the specially established economic zones^{xvi} in 1979 (Tsai, 2017, p. 137).

The economy of the Cross-Strait has long been integrated in the mode of "Economy First, Politics Later". Only from 1987 onwards, after lifting of the Martial Law, Taiwanese were permitted to visit China since the end of the civil war in 1949. However, challenges remained in terms of legal issues in investment into China. Taiwanese leaders issued

regulations which permitted indirect trade and investment and technical cooperation with China in 1989 (Fuller, 2008, p. 241). The agreement paved a series of investment from Taiwan into China.

Taiwanese investors to China were termed as *Taishang*, their dependents who follow them are termed *Taigan*, and the students who headed to Mainland China for studies were termed *Taisheng*.

The first wholly-owned Taiwan business was established in Fuzhou in 1984; it took another two years to get approval from China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (former Ministry of Foreign Trade) in 1986 (Tsai, 2017, p. 137). With the unclear policies between both China and Taiwan, there was a limitation of Taiwanese investments. However, by the end of 1989, about 2000 Taiwanese enterprises invested about 1 billion USD in China.

There are many reasons for Taiwanese investments in China. First is the rising labour costs at home. With a rapidly growing economy, the wages grew, which led the companies to look for alternatives. Second is the heavy domestic competition. Given Taiwan's limited geography the companies saturated themselves in the country, looking outwards to expand. Third, is the low production costs in China. With preferential policies towards Taiwan's businesses in China, it added an incentive to start businesses in China. With leadership change on both sides of the straits since 1949, there have been several attempts to engage each other with talks.

About 4,200 Taiwanese enterprises have invested in China. Kunshan, in Jiangshu Province of China alone hosts more than 100,000 Taiwanese *Taishang* individuals (Chang, 2021). As per the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of Taiwan, the trade volume between the two sides has declined as of this writing. In April 2023, the total trade amounted to

130.2 million USD, which saw a 25.3 per cent decline as compared to 174.4 million USD in April 2022 (MAC, 2023). In the same period, 34 cases of investment (a 21.4 per cent increase) were reported amounting to 1.5 million USD (38.2 per cent decline) from Taiwan to China compared to April 2022.

Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Trade, mentions that cumulated investments from Taiwan to China touched about 203.3 billion USD in total of 45,195 investments by 2022. Essentially the investments were in electronic parts and component manufacturing, photographic and optical instruments, and the wholesale and retail trade. The investments from China to Taiwan amounted to 2.6 billion USD in a total of 1,556 cases from 2009 to 2022. The investment areas were wholesale and retail trade, electronic goods, and the banking industry (MinistryofEconomicAffairs, 2023).

With such a large *Taishang* community in China, analysts like Shu Keng and Gunter Schubert (Keng & Schubert, 2010) have said that they can be crucial for engagements in Cross-Strait relations.

- a) *Taishang* as China's hostages: China cuts off Cross-Strait economic ties and uses them as hostages.
- b) *Taishang* as China's agents: *Taishang* supporting China's Taiwan policy in Taiwan to secure their business interests.
- c) *Taishang* as Taiwan's buffer: If China considers the *Taishang* as important to its growth, Taiwan can use them as a buffer to stop a military conflict.
- d) *Taishang* as Taiwan's lobbyists: Through their connection (*Guanxi*) in China, *Taishang* can influence policy decisions in China acting as Taiwan's lobbyists.

Table 1: A Typology of the *Taishang*'s Political Roles

China's Leverage over Taiwan	Passive Role	Active Role
	<i>Taishang</i> as China's hostages	<i>Taishang</i> as China's agents
Taiwan's Leverage over China	<i>Taishang</i> as Autonomous Actor	
	<i>Taishang</i> Taiwan's buffer	<i>Taishang</i> as Taiwan's lobbyists

Source: (Keng & Schubert, 2010, p. 297)

Nevertheless, the motto of “Economy First, Politics Later”, has been regularly challenged through several political moves. Though both Taiwan and China have benefitted from the more extensive economic connections, there have been several roadblocks as well. There have been several instances where China used economic coercion against Taiwan to try and influence the public by economic coercion.

In March 2021, China banned the pineapples imported from Taiwan citing “pesticides and harmful creatures” being found in the produce. The ban hit Taiwan’s pineapple exporters. It is said that about 46,000 metric tons of pineapples were exported from Taiwan, out of which about 90 percent of them were sent to China (Lee, 2021). Again in August 2022, post-Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, China imposed a ban on over 2066 products manufactured by over 100 Taiwanese exporters (Yang, 2022).

Such economic blockade tactics are frequently used against foreign governments that do not comply with the Chinese narrative, and this has only increased since Xi Jinping came to power. For example, Australia also saw its wine exports to China severely affected by a sudden rise of tariffs affecting millions of dollars in trade.

Some foreign and Chinese executives have also been barred from leaving China. As per the rights group Safeguard Defenders, several US

company executives who have their offices in China were the ones targeted (Chen Y. , 2023). Furthermore, the bans are not limited to the Western executives. Hideki Suzuki, former head of a Japan-China friendship group, was recently released in Beijing after six years in jail. He was arrested at Beijing airport in July 2016 and was indicted on spying charges in June 2017 (Yamaguchi, 2022).

With such hits and misses and rising assertiveness from the Chinese side, President Tsai's NSP policy was aimed to decouple the Taiwan's dependency on China. Though the dependency cannot be removed entirely given the decades of operations in China by the *Taishangs*, it has slowly started to look for alternatives to base the operations out of China.

As per Taiwan's NSP website, exports to 18 countries grew 35.2 per cent to 82.58 billion USD in 2021, up from 63.31 billion USD in 2019. Of the total trade, integrated circuits constituted about 40 per cent of the total exports. In terms of investments from NSP countries to Taiwan, a rise of 162.32 per cent to 1 billion USD was seen. Whereas the total Taiwan investment in the region rose by 105.97 per cent to 5.82 billion USD. With COVID-19 creating a supply chain disruption and the uncertainty with China's political and social policies rising, Taiwan's enterprises are looking for alternatives and diversification of sources.

2.3 Security

As mentioned earlier, the Cross-Strait security has always been challenged since 1949. However, there has been a growing and assertive change in the security scenario. As the guarantor of the Taiwan's security, the US getting involved to maintain the status quo is something that one needs to look at.

Over the decades, the military balance has shifted drastically in favour of China, both in terms of offensive and keeping US forces at bay. With

time, the nature of the warfare has also changed. Earlier, traditional warfare included the usage of hard military weapon systems. Now, warfare also includes political, disinformation, and cyber aspects.

President Tsai's first term has largely been a "Cold Peace" in the Cross-Strait relations. Dr David WF Huang explained the "Cold Peace" as a set of policies carried out by both China and Taiwan. Unless President Tsai accepted the PRC's precondition of the 1992 Consensus, there would be no official or semi-official communications between China and Taiwan, no international space for Taiwan, and no more 'economic handouts to Taiwan' (Huang, 2016). When it come to political warfare^{xvii} against Taiwan, there have been several attempts against Taiwan (Election interference during the 2018 local election — see Section 2.1). In his detailed work Kerry K Gershaneck mentioned how deep China's involvement in the 2018 and 2020 elections of Taiwan was (Gershaneck, 2020).

Due to such political interference, on 31 December 2019, the Legislative Yuan of Taipei passed the Anti-Infiltration Act to counter disinformation. The law stipulates that any organisation and individual secretly acting on behalf of the PRC would be penalised and punished (MACTaiwan, 2019). Puma Shen, an Assistant Professor at the National Taipei University's Graduate School of Criminology and director of Taipei-based DoubleThink Labs mentions how China used popular social media sites such as Facebook to spread fake news in Taiwan, and also to influence citizens of other countries towards Taiwan (Hioe, 2020).

With the early detection of the COVID-19 by Taiwanese authorities, a series of multiple disinformation campaign also followed. At the time when the world needed cooperation and transparency, Taiwan was made to sit out of the World Health Assembly (WHA) citing "One China" policy. This move led Taiwan to innovate and conduct social media campaigns such as #TaiwanCanHelp #MadeinTaiwan to let the

world know how it was helping other countries safeguard against the virus.

Taiwan has indulged in several defensive measures to mitigate such a hybrid form of warfare. Mariah Thornton, a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics, published a recent report in March 2023, on Taiwan's Political Warfare System (Thornton, 2023). The report mentions the details of the counter defensive measures adopted by the Taiwanese against the influence operations. One such measure adopted is the "All-out defence education". Educating people about social media usage can be crucial for decimating fake news. Another action taken by the Taiwan's Ministry of Defence is the hosting of "All-Out Defence Summer Camp" which educates youths about influence operations. Third, is the reaching out to community centres and local temples which mostly see larger gathering of people.

At the government level, Taiwan has also launched Ministry of Digital Affairs in August 2022 to oversee the country's digital infrastructure and cybersecurity. The ministry aims to assist agencies with data protection, and protecting business and trade from digital breaches (Tzu-hsuan, 2022).

In military terms, Taiwan has been facing a rising challenge to its territory, both over air and water. Since 2023, there has been usage of drones for air incursions to ADIZ and circling of Taiwan by the Chinese (TaipeiTimes, 2023). The drone usage around Taiwan has stepped up since April. While, data on total drone flights around Taiwan is unavailable, news reports frequently mentioning such flights can lead to a "new normal" of incursions into Taiwan.

Usage of drone particularly caught the headlines when the footage of a military post in the offshore island of Kinmen went viral in China. While any claims were denied by the CCP's mouthpiece *Global Times* (GlobalTimes, 2022), it caused massive embarrassment to the Tsai administration. Drones being cheaper alternatives will see increased

usage with time. This proved right in the Armenia-Azerbaijan war in 2022, and in the current Ukraine-Russia war.

2.4 Public Opinion

Public opinion is another way to understand the mood of people. It reflects on whether the policy decisions made by the leaders are approved by the citizens or not. In a single party system like in China, public opinion matters as it reflects to the leader that the policies are accepted by the people. Whereas, in a democracy public opinion acts like a double edged sword. It can show whether certain policies are acceptable by the people or not and it is directly linked to the popularity of the leader to be elected next. Therefore, public opinion is another variable which requires some study.

A survey conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) released its data on the upcoming elections in Taiwan. Among those surveyed, 28.9% of the people expressed a high level of satisfaction with President Tsai's performance since she took office in 2016 (TPOF, 2023). Such low level of satisfaction with the Presidentship of Tsai, hints at a possible change in the upcoming election. Though, the introduction of the new party TPP, might play a significant role in taking away a large chunk of voters who are naturally anti-KMT but also turned into anti-DPP recently since 2016 under Tsai's administration.

Taiwan's National Chengchi University's Election Study Centre also comes out with regular surveys asking its respondents on several aspects of their preferences. On the question of Taiwanese independence vs. Unification with the Mainland, about 28.7 per cent respondents favoured maintaining status quo and deciding later. On the question of status quo, about 28.5 per cent agreed on the current terms (NCCU, 2023).

In another survey conducted by Adam Y Liu and Xiaojun Li, 55 per cent respondents were in favour of “launching a unification war to take back Taiwan entirely” and only 33 per cent responded unfavourably to a full-scale war. On the question of status quo, 55 per cent responded favourably, whereas 32 per cent were against it (Liu & Li, 2023).

Taiwanese youths have been affected by multiple preferential policies by China towards Taiwan.^{xviii} One such policy was launched on 28 February 2018 when China’s Taiwan Affairs office announced a set of 31 New Preferences Policies (31PP) to attract Taiwanese to China (Schubert, 2018). The goal was to bring talented Taiwanese to China and make them part of the “Made in China 2025” strategy.

As we covered the historical and the current status of the Cross-Strait relations, the next section will talk about the role of the foreign actors and how their policies also influence the complicated relations.

4) Role of Foreign Actors

4.1 US and its Allies in the Region

The US involvement in the Cross-Strait affairs can be seen post-World War II which mired the beginning of the Cold War. US assisted the KMT government in Mainland and later when it moved to Taiwan via military, economic, and political ways. US used Taiwan’s pilots and military facilities to gather information about Chinese military. Taiwanese pilots were trained in using American planes (Bergin, 2013, p. 21). US's economic aid to Taiwan in its early days was also crucial for the growth of the economy.


The brotherhood between KMT and US ended with US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. The visit led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between US and China led by PRC in 1979. Since, then US has kept unofficial relations with Taiwan

through Taiwan Relations Act passed in US Congress on 1 January 1979 (Hon, 1972).

Successive US governments have repeatedly emphasised maintaining status quo in the Cross-Strait. The US does not support any unilateral change in the region. To maintain the military balance between the PRC and ROC, Washington has been assisting Taipei in getting the arms which are mostly defensive in nature. Regularly, the US has also allowed its military presence in the Taiwan Straits as a show of support to Taiwan and discouraging PRC to use military against ROC.

Figure 2 explains US as being an external actor which plays a critical role in the trilateral relation. For the Cross-Strait relationship, the US can “Push and Pull” in terms of ROC declaration of independence and removing economic dependence at PRC. Such policies can determine the US's external influence and has leverage on both sides of the straits regarding peace or conflict between Taiwan and China.

Figure 2:
Conceptual Framework on Cross-Strait Peace and War



Source: (Panigrahi, 2022, p. 28)

A report by Brookings published on 6 April 2023, reflected people's opinions in Taiwan based on party affiliations on how Taiwanese see US support. On the question as to whether the instability in the Cross-Strait is due to US being unclear about sending troops to defend Taiwan, 36.9 per cent of the respondents (who identified themselves as KMT supporters) agreed, whereas 63.1 per cent disagreed; 51.9 per cent of DPP supporters agreed whereas 48.1 per cent disagreed. Among the independents, 38.7 per cent agreed, and 61.3 per cent disagreed (Johnston, Chia-hung, & Yin, 2023). The response from the DPP supporters reflects the mood to declare independence but with US support.

At present the growing US-China rivalry from trade to security also dawn the Cross-Strait relations. China has placed itself at a vantage point militarily against US and its allies in the Taiwan Strait. China has also developed Anti-access Area Denial (AA-AD) tactics, such as long-range anti-ship and anti-air missiles and other military hardware. Such military hardware can be used if any foreign power comes to aid the Taiwanese military, in case of a military action.

The closest ally that US has to Taiwan is Japan in the north of Taiwan, with its own base at Okinawa. The Japanese leadership has increasingly raised its concern of the rising Chinese military. The military exercises by China which followed Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan saw some of the missiles landing in Japan's EEZ. Since 2012, there have been regular incursions towards Japanese controlled *Senkaku islands* (*Diaoyu Island* as per PRC) (Jiji, 2023). Japan's former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe referred to Taiwan as an "important partner" and "precious friend" (Sacks, 2022).

Japan, like Taiwan, also face regular air incursions into its EEZ since 2012. As per data compiled through the Ministry of Defense and open media reports, the air incursions have only increased against Japan since 2012. The data indicates 300 incursions in 2012; 2013 data was

unavailable; 372 in 2014; 571 in 2015; 851 in 2016; 500 in 2017; 638 in 2018; 675 in 2019; 458 in 2020; 722 in 2021 and 446 in 2022 until 30 September of that year.

Though militarily and strategically both the US and Japan, are in competition with China, but their being economically interlinked cannot be ignored. Such larger dependence on China for own national gains has led to strategic ambiguity by the US. There has been a growing concern on to have strategic clarity when it comes to the issue of Taiwan.

A big challenge that is faced by the US and its allies against China is the rise of cyberwarfare. The US National Security Agency and their counterparts in Canada, UK, Australia came out with a report that highlighted that Microsoft had found a new hacking group “Volt Typhoon” that is Chinese state sponsored. The report highlighted a recent cyber-attack on US facilities in Guam, a crucial base for the American military that can be critical in responding to a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan (NSA, 2023).

4.2 Southeast Asia

The Southeast Asia is another crucial region for Taiwan as part of its NSP policy. A large segment of foreign workers in Taiwan for blue-collar jobs, are primarily from Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam^{xix} (NIA, 2023). These foreign workers work in healthcare, fishing, and manufacturing industries. Being in Taiwan, the foreign workers play a crucial role in economy, especially when they send the remittances back, and keep the Taiwanese manufacturing and old age health care system running.

The foreign workers from Southeast Asia are important for multiple reasons. First, is the accelerating demography of Taiwan. The decline of the birth rate in Taiwan has led it to become a “super-aged” society by 2025 (NDC, 2022). As per the National Development Council, the share

of the population aged above 65 increased from 2.5 per cent in the 1950s to 17.56 per cent in 2021. But as per projections by 2060, it will reach 41.4 per cent of the total population. By naturalising some of the foreign workers via inter marriages or letting the workers to become citizens of Taiwan, the challenge in demography can be addressed.

Second, is the alternative to China. When President Tsai took power and refused to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus. China stopped tour groups and individuals travelling to Taiwan causing massive disruption in the tourism industry (Bloomberg, 2019). The ban led to closures of multiple hotels, restaurants and other businesses which were largely dependent on inflow of tourists from China. In 2019, 23 per cent or 2.73 million tourists coming to Taiwan were from Mainland (Jennings, 2023). COVID-19 was again a disruption to the movement of people between the countries.

Since 2016, the trade between Taiwan and the NSP countries has boomed by 55 per cent from 96.3 billion USD to 149 billion USD. Taiwan's investment in NSP countries has increased to 5.8 billion USD as compared to 2.4 billion USD since 2016. In 2022, the investments in NSP countries passed 2.2 billion USD from January to July, amounting to 43.9 per cent of Taiwan's total investment abroad. (Rickards, 2022)

As some of the workers become naturalised citizens termed as "New Immigrants", Taiwan's political parties have adopted new methods to woo them. As per the Ministry of the Interior, there are around 5,70,000 new immigrants in Taiwan, amounting to 2.4 per cent of the island's population. Most new immigrants hail from China, including Hong Kong and Macau, followed by Vietnam and Indonesia. Some of the methods used by the political candidates to attract the new immigrants is to include the languages (Vietnamese and others) in election posters, conduct cultural activities, and also to put out their concerns during election campaigns (Yee, 2022). Additionally, the Central Election Commission of Taiwan has also run multiple awareness campaigns to

encourage the new citizens to vote in the elections across different cities of Taiwan (CEC, 2021).

Besides their life in Taiwan, some of the NSP countries from Southeast Asia are also in contention with Taiwan on maritime boundary in South China Sea (SCS). It is to note that, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Indonesia also have overlapping claims on the SCS along with Taiwan and China.

Huang Xilian, Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines recently made a statement at the 8th Manila Forum, where he warned the Philippines leadership against interfering in the “core issue” of Taiwan and advising that they think of the safety of their citizens in Taiwan, causing uneasiness in Manila (Philstar, 2023).

The statement by Ambassador Xilian stands contradictory of the Cross-Strait being a domestic issue with respect to the PRC’s attempt. By making such statements, it only internationalises the issue with involvement of other countries.

5) India’s Policy Outlook in CSR

Post India’s independence, in November 1948, Indian Ambassador to Nanking (now as Nanjing), reported to New Delhi that Chiang Kai-shek’s position as China’s President had become “untenable” leading the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to ask the Ministry of External Affairs to not get too involved with the “expiring government in China” (Gokhale, 2023, p. 11).

Following this, India recognised PRC and transferred its diplomatic ties with ROC on 30 December 1949 (Gokhale, 2023, p. 11). As India’s former foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale showed in his recent work, India attempted to play as a negotiator and a facilitator for peace talks at regular intervals during the missile crisis in 1954-55, and 1958. But it

was ignored due to larger geopolitical play by the then superpowers (Gokhale, 2023, p. 19).

The bilateral ties between India and Taiwan got a second boost when both sides on consultation with each other decided to open representative offices at each other's country in 1995. In his interview with *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vinod C. Khanna^{xx}, described conditions that preceded setting up an Indian Mission in Taipei. The Indian mission was named as India-Taipei Association (ITA), whereas the Taiwan mission in New Delhi was named as Taipei Economic and Cultural Center (TECC). Over time, the TECC has now a mission in Chennai as well.

Vinod C Khanna mentioned the priority for the ITA under him was to, "steer clear of political issues and concentrating on attracting Taiwanese investment, promoting bilateral trade and encouraging tourism to India" (IFAJ, 2010, p. 242). Since then, this policy has been maintained consistently.

In August 2022, there was a minor change in this policy. Without naming Taiwan, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said that like many other countries, India too is concerned about this development, and urged all parties against unilateral actions and exercise restraint (HindustanTimes, 2022). The statement reflected the MEA position and it appeared at a time when India and China had been engaged in long border talks post-Galwan incident in 2020. The statement was seen as a change in India's approach to Cross-Strait after many decades.

Since Ukraine-Russia war began in February 2022, questions were also raised about India's response to a similar crisis in Cross-Strait, especially post-Nancy Pelosi's visit. Responding to this, Jabin T Jacob in his work mentioned that India's ties with Taiwan are not deep or extensive enough yet to get involved in a Cross-Strait dispute and the

ties with PRC shouldn't be mixed with other bilateral relations (Jacob, 2022, p. 152).

Going beyond political relations, there are several other verticals where both India and Taiwan are working. This section, will discuss the larger picture of education, health, and trade engagements as well as the challenges in India-Taiwan relations.

In terms of education, there has been a steady increase of scholarships for Indian students in Taiwan. As per the data collected from TECC, New Delhi, since 2018, Ministry of Education, Taiwan Scholarship has increased the scholarship quotas each year. Table 2 describes the number of scholarship has increase over the years. The biggest gainers are those who receive Huayu Enrichment Scholarship (primarily to learn Chinese), which has seen a sharp rise from 180 months in 2018 in total to 276 months in 2022.

Table 2: Distribution of Scholarships provided by the Ministry of Education, Taiwan towards Indian Students

Year	Name of the Scholarship	
	<i>Taiwan Scholarship</i>	<i>Huayu Enrichment Scholarship</i>
2018	40	180 months
2019	45	192 months
2020	45	216 months
2021	46	216 months
2022	48	276 months

Source: Ministry of Education, TECC, New Delhi

As per Taiwan's Ministry of Education (MOE), there were 2239 Indian students in universities across Taiwan (MOE, 2022). The major attraction of Taiwanese universities for Indian students is their low cost and ease of living along with a quality education. Such factors attract Indian students to Taiwan. Taiwan has also encouraged Indian scholars

for fellowship under Taiwan Fellowship program as encouraged by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).

MOE, Taiwan partnered with the Taiwanese universities to open Taiwan Education Centers in India (TECs) since 2011. As per data provided by the MOE, TECC, New Delhi and TEC Program Office at National Tsing Hua University, as of now there are total of 27 TECs in India providing Mandarin language training and over 11,000 students being trained so far. TECs have been at the forefront in promoting Taiwan in India, and a bridge for Indian students to find opportunities in Taiwan.

The TECs are seen as less suspicious than the Confucius Institute of China. India, like other countries, post review of the Confucius Institute began to close them citing interference and changing public perception (Rahman & Hasija, 2021). Since there is a huge demand of Mandarin learning in India, TECs have filled some of those gaps.

A bottom to top approach has also been attempted recently. In April 2022, Taiwan launched the International Education Program 2.0 for Primary and Secondary Schools in India, which aims for partnership among primary and secondary schools in India (MOETaiwan, 2022). Following the program, recently in 2023, a group of Indian school principals visited Taiwan and interacted with their Taiwanese counterparts. There are about 47 Indian schools, second only to South Korea, that have participated in this program so far (CNA, 2023).

Another aspect of cooperation that has been possible without the interference of the political reality is the joint project by Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), India and National Science and Technological Council (NSTC), Taiwan. This has allowed scholars from both India and Taiwan to apply to projects jointly on several thematic areas (ISTI, 2023).

When it comes to trade, there is a rise in Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) from Taiwan to India. Most of these investments are done by semiconductor companies of Taiwan that want to diversify production in a global rearrangement of supply chain.

Among all these positive non-political associations or methods of cooperation's there are also several challenges to bilateral cooperation.

First, is the lack of understanding of each other. There are still limited knowledge of each other's culture, languages, and social values. This has led to several misunderstandings and in some cases caused investors to shy away. For instance, clashes at the Taiwanese company of Mediatek near Bangalore where the company faced a loss of 3 million USD.

Second, is the geographical distance. The lack and limits of resumption of direct flights (which was active until pre-COVID) has led the already distanced relations to lag further. Primarily, the Indian diaspora in Taiwan consists of students enrolled in higher studies who do not travel frequently. The same goes for the Taiwanese citizens in India, where only a handful of them are engaged in business.

Third, is lack of any physical product in the Indian markets which can be associated closely with Taiwan. For example, the rise of K-pop and K-dramas in India has sparked interest among Indians towards Korean culture. Similar products are missing from Taiwan which can be closely associated by the Indians.

Fourth, is the bureaucracy. The red tape on both sides also shares a part of the blame. This not only reflects lack of seriousness towards each other but also the need to prioritise.

6) Tentative Scenarios for India pre/in Cross-Strait Conflict

Tensions in Cross-Strait relations in the future have a higher potential to create a ripple effect across the world. With the world getting technologically dependent with each other and the niche of the semiconductor technology coming from Taiwan, it is important for India to be prepared for any possible scenarios that might unfold due to conflict over Taiwan.

First challenge that India might face during a military crisis is of taking sides. In 2022 and at the time of writing this project, India was asked by multiple organisations and nations to condemn Russia for its actions against Ukraine. India can find itself in such a situation when it comes to a potential Cross-Strait conflict. In such a scenario, India will also have to evacuate thousands of students and others who work and do business in Taiwan.

On a similar note, India's approach to a conflict in the Cross-Strait should also be anticipated in case China forcefully occupies the offshore islands controlled by Taiwan including the Taiping Island^{xxi}, Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu.

Second, it will face a challenge to secure its trade to Korean peninsula, Japan and ASEAN nations which passes through Taiwan Strait and in SCS. With the US commitments to Taiwan in getting involved in any conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and Japan possibly getting involved as well, it is going to affect the crucial trade route of India. Ambassador Gokhale's work on the implications of a Cross-Strait escalation considers the possible impact on the volume of trade between India and the East Asian region.

Third, India might face the ground or aerial incursions similar to Galwan which China might use to create a higher tension between the two nuclear armed neighbours for deception. Such an act can either occur before a concrete military action against Taiwan by China. This

will allow China ample time to conduct its initial attack in a blitzkrieg manner.

Fourth, a scenario where the military action against India and a South China Sea military action similar to 1978 against Vietnam might occur simultaneously, this time though against the Philippines. Chinese ambassador to the Philippines recently warned the country of its Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) security in case a conflict occurs (Lazaro, 2023), and also blocking its Coast Guards ships to resupply the Philippine controlled shoals in the region largely disputed by other claimants. (AssociatedPress, 2023). The recently updated Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2023 with the US, signed originally in 2014, is also seen suspiciously by China. Therefore, all these factors can make the Philippines another target of deception.

The Fifth and final scenario that this monograph would like to hypothesise is the influence and interference in India's internal situations. Disturbances in the Northeast, the conflict with Pakistan and as well as fake news can be spread around to create hate and misinformation, leading to riots or sabotage acts against Critical Infrastructures (CIs) such as grid failures, train derailments, or even disruption in cell phone networks can cause severe confusion and delay in the response of government agencies.

6. Future Trajectories

This monograph proposes certain actions which Indian policymakers might approach in the future to mitigate the risks that it may face during a conflict in the straits.

First, is to how to counter disinformation. India, by engaging with Taiwan, can understand how the latter tackle disinformation campaigns against its society, such as during elections.

Second, is to have a “Whole of Societal” approach to counter the disinformation campaigns. The agencies in India need to approach such policy not from top to bottom, but also vice versa - by educating students from schools and colleges, radio shows, and social media. People should be able to filter fake news from real, which will save time, energy, and resources for the government. The role of private sectors in disseminating such threats will be crucial as well. Given their vast resources and reach across the country, they can be tapped to promote such campaigns.

Third, is language training. Taiwan can plug the gap of Mandarin teachers in India. With geopolitical tensions with China at a peak due to Galwan incident, Taiwan can assist in increasing their TECs in India to train a large pool of language experts. Such talent pool can be crucial not only building bridges between the two sides but also can give them employment in both public and private sectors.

Fourth, proposition is the need to engage Taiwan’s non-politically elected leaders via Track 1.5 and 2. This will assist in understanding the future leaders views on Taiwan’s internal political dynamics and also its views on China. By engaging with non-elected leaders, India can swiftly avoid any complications in its relations with China and its “One-China Policy”.

Fifth and the last is to study how other countries in the region interact and balance their Cross-Strait policies. Studying the geographically closer countries in Southeast Asia, South Korea, and Japan engagement with Taiwan can provide ideas on multitudes of ideas to India on several unique methods and possibly work together with such countries to avoid any threat to its interests in the region.

7. Conclusion

An attempt has been made in this monograph to put forward the overall picture of Cross-Strait relations from the past to present, the internal political dynamics of Taiwan, and where India can find itself in a potential conflict. Though not extensive in the history of the Cross-Strait, the time line of the Cross-Strait relations will assist the readers in highlighting the major incidents. As India has moved from regional power to middle power, it cannot afford to ignore the Cross-Strait affairs.

The monograph aimed at putting forward some of the possibilities where Indian policymakers can find themselves at the crossroads of continuing their engagement with East Asia in case there is a policy dilemma that might occur in the time of a crisis between Taiwan and China.

Bilaterally, the challenges still remains between India and Taiwan to further strengthen their ties at a strategic level, but increasing more people-to-people and Track 1.5 dialogues can pave the way for better understanding between each other.

Bibliography

- Thompson, L. G. (1963). The Earliest Chinese Eyewitness Accounts of the Formosan Aborigines. *Monumenta Serica*, 23, 163-204.
- Siu, Y. (2022). *Maritime Exclusion Policy in Ming China and Chosŏn Korea, 1368-1450: Dynastic Authority, National Security, and Trade*. Retrieved March 12, 2023, from University of Oxford: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:68239bdc-cfde-46db-bd42-386e21dfabba/download_file?file_format=application%2Fpdf&safe_filename=Degree_thesis-Yiu_Siu.pdf&type_of_work=Thesis
- John E. Wills, J. (1999). The Seventeenth-Century Transformation: Taiwan Under the Dutch and the Cheng Regime. In M. A. Rubinstein, *Taiwan A New History* (pp. 84-106). London: An East Gate Book.
- Hishida, S. (1907, June). Formosa: Japan's First Colony. *Political Science Quarterly*, 22(2), 267-281.
- John E. Wills, J. (1999). The Seventeenth Century Transformation: Taiwan Under the Dutch and the Cheng Regime. In M. A. Rubenstein, *Taiwan A New History* (pp. 84-106). London: An East Gate Book.
- Beng, S. (2017). *Taiwan's 400 Year History*. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc.
- TaiwanAffairsOffice. (2022, August 10). *China releases white paper on Taiwan question, reunification in new era*. Retrieved from The State Council: The People's Republic of China: https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html
- TaiwanAffairsOffice. (1993, August 31). *The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China*. Retrieved from The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/index.htm>
- Philips, S. (2007). Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945-

1948. In M. A. Rubinstein, *Taiwan: A New History* (pp. 275-320). London: East Gate Book.
- Yu, M. M. (2016). The Battle of Quemoy: The Amphibious Assault That Held the Postwar Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait. *Naval War College Review*, 69(2), 91-107.
- M.H.Halperin. (1966). *The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History (U)*. RAND Corporation. RAND Corporation.
- Wei, L. (2022, August 3). *Notice authorized to be released by Xinhua News Agency*. Retrieved April 2023, from Ministry of National Defense:
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/4917250.html
- Nemoto, R., & Miki, R. (2022, August 4). *5 Chinese missiles land in Japan's EEZ: defense chief*. Retrieved April 2023, from Nikkei Asia: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-tensions/5-Chinese-missiles-land-in-Japan-s-EEZ-defense-chief>
- ROCMND. (2022, August 3). *Defense News*. Retrieved April 2023, from Press Release: <https://www.mnd.gov.tw/english/>
- Shan, S. (2023, April 14). *Taiwan asks airlines to avoid no-fly zone set by China*. Retrieved April 2023, from Taipei Times: <https://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/04/14/2003797910>
- TaiwanAffairsOffice. (1999). Document 1: PRC White Paper, "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China" 31 August 1993. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 26(2), 77-93.
- TaiwanAffairsOffice. (2000, February 21). *PRC White Paper--The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue*. Retrieved April 2023, from Taiwan Documents Projects:
<http://www.taiwandocuments.org/white.htm>
- TaiwanAffairsOffice. (2000). PRC White Paper, "The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 27(1), 38-54.

- Orita, K. (2023, April 26). *POLITICS & SECURITY[Speaking Out] Even China's Peaceful Unification with Taiwan Will Be a Serious Matter for Japan* . Retrieved 2023 May, from Japan Forward: https://japan-forward.com/speaking-out-even-chinas-peaceful-unification-with-taiwan-will-be-a-serious-matter-for-japan/?fbclid=IwAR0jH_Es6pWBC9zLey4I1vz6JyFuQSmriwPQy7gAudfS1kkfHVbMUTCr08g
- Wachman, A. M. (2008). *Why Taiwan?* Singapore, Singapore: NUS Press.
- UNGA. (1971, October 25). *Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations*. Retrieved May 2023, from United Nations Digital Library: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en>
- Teng-Hui, L. (1995, June 9). *Pres. Lee Teng-Hui, Cornell University Commencement Address, June 9, 1995*. Retrieved May 2023, from USC US-China Institute: <https://china.usc.edu/pres-lee-teng-hui-cornell-university-commencement-address-june-9-1995>
- Hsiung, J. C. (2000). Diplomacy against Adversity: Foreign Relations under Chiang Ching-kuo. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 27(2), 111-123.
- FCJ. (1990, October 4). *Unification Council to Debut*. Retrieved May 2023, from TAIWAN INFO: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160701121134/http://taiwan.info.nat.gov.tw/fp.asp?xItem=10133&CtNode=103>
- Cole, J. M. (2017). Civic Activism and Protests in Taiwan: Why Size Doesn't (always) Matter. In D. Fell, *Taiwan's Social Movements under Ma Ying-jeou* (pp. 18-33). London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
- Jacobs, B. (2016, January 6). *Taiwan was never part of China*. Retrieved from Taipei Times: <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2016/01/06/2003636520>

- Shui-bian, C. (2000, May 20). *中華民國第十任總統、副總統就職慶祝大會 (Inauguration Ceremony for the Tenth President and Vice President of the Republic of China)*. Retrieved May 2023, from Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan): <https://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6742>
- Weymouth, L. (2016, July 21). *Opinion Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen: Beijing must respect our democratic will*. Retrieved May 2023, from Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2016/07/21/44b0a1a4-4e25-11e6-a422-83ab49ed5e6a_story.html
- Tzu-yu, P., & Huang, F. (2022, November 11). *COST OF LIVING/Fewer Taiwan workers earning less than NT\$30,000 in regular wage*. Retrieved May 2023, from Focus Taiwan: <https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202211250006>
- Waksman, I. (2022, May 7). *Seeking land justice for indigenous communities*. Retrieved May 2023, from Taipei Times: <https://www.taipetimes.com/News/feat/archives/2022/05/07/2003777832>
- Rickards, J. (2019, May 16). *The Looming Challenge for National Healthcare Insurance*. Retrieved May 2023, from AmCham Taiwan: <https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2019/05/the-looming-challenge-for-national-healthcare-insurance/>
- Lee, Y., Wu, S., & Torode, G. (2022, November 17). *Beijing's freeze on Taipei contact fuels concern over risk of military clash*. Retrieved May 2023, from the Japan Times: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/11/17/asia-pacific/china-taiwan-contact-freeze/>
- Schubert, G. (2018, March 21). *China's 31 Preference Policies For Taiwan: An Opportunity, No Threat*. Retrieved from Taiwan Insight: <https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/03/21/chinas-new-31-preference-policies-for-taiwan-an-opportunity-no-threat/>
- Charlier, P. (2019, November 23). *Chilling details of Chinese interference in Taiwan's democratic elections emerge: KMT*

- presidential candidate strikes out in defense*. Retrieved May 2023, from Taiwan English News:
<https://taiwanenglishnews.com/chilling-details-of-chinese-interference-in-taiwans-democratic-elections-emerge-kmt-presidential-candidate-strikes-out-in-defense/>
- 60Minutes. (2019). *World Exclusive: Chinese spy spills secrets to expose Communist espionage | 60 Minutes Australia*. Retrieved May 2023, from YouTube:
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zDR-l35Ladk>
- Smith, C. D. (2022, June 21). *How pro-China is the KMT now?* Retrieved May 2023, from Taiwan News:
<https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4576006?fbclid=IwAR3DTZBWggMul-Cjgx1xbbfxetMQwPdwwQsij6IVitp9mW47YRMduoaSSzI>
- Fuller, D. B. (2008, March/April). The Cross-Strait Economic Relationship's Impact on Development in Taiwan and China: Adversaries and Partners. *Asian Survey*, 48(2), 239-264.
- Rigger, S. (2021). *The TIGER leading the DRAGON*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Tsai, C.-m. (2017). The Nature and Trend of Taiwanese Investment in China (1991–2014): Business Orientation, Profit Seeking, and Depoliticization. In L. Dittmer, *Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace* (pp. 133-150). California: University of California Press.
- MAC. (2023, April). *PRELIMINARY STATISTICS OF CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC RELATIONS*. Retrieved 2023 May, from Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan):
<https://ws.mac.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9VcGxvYWQvMjk3L2NrZmlsZS85ODRmMTk4My0wNmYwLTRiMjUyUWE3YS1mYTvmZjM2ZWQ1MmEucGRm&n=UFJFTEINSU5BUIlFU1RBVEITVEIDU19PRI9DUk9TUy1TVFJBSVRfRUNPTk9NSUNfUkVMQVRJT05TLGxMTIwNF8pLXBkZi5wZGY%3d>

- Ministry of Economic Affairs. (2023, February). *Cross-Straits Economic Relations*. Retrieved May 2023, from Bilateral Trade/China:
<https://www.trade.gov.tw/English/BilateralTrade/BilateralTrade.aspx?code=7030&nodeID=4639&areaID=2&country=TW&fbmxbmQgQ2hpbmE=>
- Keng, S., & Schubert, G. (2010, March/April). Agents of Taiwan-China Unification? The Political Roles of Taiwanese Business People in the Process of Cross-Strait Integration. *Asian Survey*, 50(2), 287-210.
- Lee, Y. (2021, February 26). *Forbidden fruit: Taiwan urges people to eat more pineapples after China ban*. Retrieved May 2023, from Reuters: <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/forbidden-fruit-taiwan-urges-people-eat-more-pineapples-after-china-ban-2021-02-26/>
- Yang, S. (2022, August 2). *China blacklists over 100 Taiwanese food exporters on eve of Pelosi's potential visit*. Retrieved May 2023, from Taiwan News:
<https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4614020>
- Chen, Y. (2023). *TRAPPED: China's Expanding Use of Exit bans*. safeguardDefenders.
- Yamaguchi, M. (2022, November 30). *Freed Japan-China friendship group head says charges false*. Retrieved May 2023, from AP News: <https://apnews.com/article/china-japan-arrests-beijing-treatment-of-prisoners-236f0bb98bccad9c686657253cfe29ab>
- Chang, H. (2021, July 8). *Taiwan businesses: Exiting China not an option amid struggle for survival*. Retrieved May 2023, from Commonwealth Magazine:
<https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3030>
- Stokes, M., & Hsiao, R. (2013). *The People's Liberation Army General Political Department Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics*. Arlington: Project 20149 Institute.

- Huang, D. W. (2016, December 7). *“Cold Peace” and the Nash Equilibrium in Cross-Strait Relations (Part 1)*. Retrieved May 2023, from Global Taiwan Institute:
<https://globaltaiwan.org/2016/12/cold-peace-and-the-nash-equilibrium-in-cross-strait-relations-part-1/>
- Gershaneck, K. K. (2020). *Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China's Plan to "Win without Fighting"*. Quantico, Virginia, United States: Marine Corps University Press.
- MACTaiwan. (2019, December 31). *Legislative Yuan Passes Anti-Infiltration Bill to Strengthen Defense for Democracy and Preserve Stable and Orderly Cross-Strait Exchanges*. Retrieved May 2023, from Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan):
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&s=88E5E1EF1343B1B8
- Hioe, B. (2020, January 6). *Fighting Fake News and Disinformation in Taiwan: An Interview with Puma Shen*. Retrieved May 2023, from New Bloom:
<https://newbloommag.net/2020/01/06/puma-shen-interview/>
- Thornton, M. (2023). *Countering United Front Work: Taiwan's Political Warfare System*. London School of Economics IDEAS. London : LSE IDEAS.
- Tzu-hsuan, L. (2022, August 6). *Digital affairs ministry to be launched on Aug. 27*. Retrieved May 2023, from Taipei Times:
<https://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/08/06/2003783064>
- TaipeiTimes. (2023, May 15). *PLA drone flights aimed at mapping routes: experts*. Retrieved May 2023, from Taipei Times:
<https://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/05/15/2003799821>

- GlobalTimes. (2022, August 22). *Did the PLA fly a drone around watchhouse in Kinmen?* Retrieved May 2023, from Global Times:
<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/1273813.shtml>
- TPOF. (2023, May 11). 2023 年 5 月 11 日「國人對蔡英文總通執政七年的評價」. Retrieved May 2023, from Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation: <https://www.tpof.org/台灣政治/總統聲望/2023年5月11日「國人對蔡英文總通執政七年的評價」/>
- Liu, A. Y., & Li, X. (2023, May 14). Assessing Public Support for (Non-) Peaceful Unification with Taiwan: Evidence from a Nationwide Survey in China. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 1-13.
- NCCU. (2023, January 13). *Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2022/12)*. Retrieved May 2023, from Election Study Center, National Chengchi University:
<https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963>
- Panigrahi, M. K. (2022). Can China Emulate Russian Aggression in Taiwan? In S. Pathak, & M. K. Panigrahi, *Drifts and Dynamics: Russia's Ukraine War and Northeast* (pp. 23-43). New Delhi: Pentagon Press.
- Bergin, B. (2013, June). The Growth of China's Air Defenses: Responding to Covert Overflights, 1949–1974. *Studies in Intelligence*, 57(2), 19-28. Retrieved May 2023, from Moves and Countermove: <https://www.cia.gov/static/Growth-of-Chinas-Air.pdf>
- Hon, E. (1972). *Nixon's Peking Trip: The Road to China's Russian War*. (R. D. Hon, Ed.) San Francisco, California, USA: Henson Co.
- Johnston, A. I., Chia-hung, T., & Yin, G. (2023, April 5). *When might US political support be unwelcome in Taiwan?* Retrieved May 2023, from BROOKINGS:
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/04/05/when-might-us-political-support-be-unwelcome-in-taiwan/>

- Jiji. (2023, January 30). *Chinese coast guard ships approach Japanese vessels near Senkakus*. Retrieved May 2023, from the japan times:
<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/01/30/national/senkakus-japanese-vessels-approached/>
- Sacks, D. (2022, July 13). *Shinzo Abe Transformed Japan's Relationship With Taiwan to Counter Threats from China*. Retrieved May 2023, from Council on Foreign Relations:
<https://www.cfr.org/blog/shinzo-abe-transformed-japans-relationship-taiwan-counter-threats-china>
- NSA. (2023). *People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection*. NSA, USA. Retrieved from Joint Cybersecurity Advisory:
https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
- NIA. (2023, March 25). *2023.2 Foreign Residents by Nationality*. Retrieved June 2023, from Ministry of the Interior, National Immigration Agency, ROC (Taiwan):
https://www.immigration.gov.tw/5475/5478/141478/141380/340268/cp_news
- NDC. (2022, August 23). **【最新2022至2070年人口推估報告出爐】** - *The Latest Population Report 2022-2070*. Retrieved June 2023, from National Development Council:
https://www.ndc.gov.tw/nc_14813_36128
- Bloomberg. (2019, August 1). *China bans individual travel to Taiwan*. Retrieved June 2023, from Bloomberg:
<https://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/08/01/2003719708>
- Jennings, R. (2023, February 3). *Taiwan expects a million mainland Chinese tourists in 2023 after 3-year freeze-out*. Retrieved from South China Morning Post:
<https://www.scmp.com/economy/china->

economy/article/3209007/taiwan-expects-million-mainland-chinese-tourists-2023-after-3-year-freeze-out#

- Rickards, J. (2022, December 29). *New Southbound Policy: A Ray of Light Amid Economic Doldrums*. Retrieved June 2023, from AmCham Taiwan:
<https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2022/12/new-southbound-policy-a-ray-of-light-amid-economic-doldrums/>
- Yee, Y. W. (2022, November 24). *Taiwan's election candidates go all out to woo the new immigrant vote*. Retrieved June 2023, from Asia News Network: <https://asianews.network/taiwan-election-candidates-go-all-out-to-woo-the-new-immigrant-vote/>
- CEC. (2021, January 12). *2020 Voting awareness promotion campaigns to new immigrants*. Retrieved June 2023, from Central Election Commission:
<https://web.cec.gov.tw/central/cms/2020Voting>
- Philstar. (2023, April 17). *FULL TEXT: Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian's Remarks at the 8th Manila Forum*. Retrieved May 2023, from philstarGLOBAL:
<https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2023/04/17/2259558/full-text-chinese-ambassador-huang-xilians-remarks-8th-manila-forum>
- Gokhale, V. (2023). *What Should India Do Before the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis?* New Delhi: Carnegie India.
- IFAJ. (2010, April-June). The India-Taipei Association: A Mission Extraordinaire. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, 5(2), 240-251.
- HindustanTimes. (2022, August 12). *India concerned about Taiwan developments, calls for de-escalation of tension*. Retrieved June 2023, from Hindustan Times:
<https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-concerned-about-taiwan-developments-calls-for-restraint-101660302799666.html>

- Jacob, J. T. (2022). A Potential Conflict over Taiwan: A View from India. *The Washington Quarterly*, 45(3), 147-162.
- MOE. (2022, October 19). *Number of Students*. Retrieved October 19, 2022, from Ministry of Education, Taiwan:
<https://stats.moe.gov.tw/statedu/chart.aspx?pvalue=36>
- MOETaiwan. (2022, 4 29). *School-level International Education Program between India and Taiwan Launched*. Retrieved June 2023, from Ministry of Education, ROC (Taiwan):
<https://english.moe.gov.tw/cp-117-30856-bffe0-1.html>
- CNA. (2023, 5 20). *印度中小學校長首次組團訪台 加強雙邊教育交流 (Indian primary and secondary school principals visit Taiwan for the first time to strengthen bilateral educational exchanges)*. Retrieved June 2023, from CNA:
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/ahel/202305200026.aspx?fbclid=IwAR1zkZ9Hvm7oGyXcF8I7_D-bxKJ5JYA8VuSleV8D_RvkekykGm2zfV2qw7k
- ISTI. (2023, April). *ICSSR and NSTC call for proposals in different domains of Social Science research*. Retrieved June 2023, from Announcements & Opportunities:
<https://www.indiascienceandtechnology.gov.in/announcementsopportunity/icssr-and-nstc-call-proposals-different-domains-social-science-research>
- Lazaro, J. (2023, April 15). *China envoy's Edca warning cites fate of Taiwan OFWs Read more:*
<https://globalnation.inquirer.net/213468/sino-envoys-edca-warning-cites-fate-of-taiwan-ofws#ixzz86TCG9Obq> Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook.
 Retrieved from Inquirer:
<https://globalnation.inquirer.net/213468/sino-envoys-edca-warning-cites-fate-of-taiwan-ofws>

- AssociatedPress. (2023, April 27). *Chinese ship blocks Philippine vessel as journalists watch*. Retrieved from Associated Press: <https://apnews.com/video/politics-philippines-south-china-sea-associated-press-8f987dafcd72482d9b9c0378817327a8>
- Chen, K. (2022, June 7). *KMT Chairman Eric Chu visits US State Department*. Retrieved May 2023, from Taiwan News: <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4562589>
- Rahman, S., & Hasija, N. (2021, July 16). *Education diplomacy to improve India-Taiwan relations?* Retrieved from Observer Research Foundation: <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/education-diplomacy-to-improve-india-taiwan-relations/>
- (n.d.).

Appendix

Appendix 1: Immigration from Fujian and Guangdong province to Taiwan

The Dutch Withdrawal	1661 approx.	100,000 (2,500 families)
The Cheng Surrender	1683 approx.	200,000 (30,000 families)
The Qing Dynasty	1795 approx.	1,300,000
The Qing Dynasty	1811 approx.	2,000,000 (240,000 families)
The Qing Dynasty	1893 approx.	2,500,000 (500,000 families)
Meiji Japan	1905	2,973,280
Taisho Japan	1912	3,294,448
Showa Japan	1937	5,261,404
The Japanese Surrender	1945 approx.	6,000,000
The Chiang Regime	1950 approx.	6,900,000
The Chiang Regime	1960 approx.	8,800,000
The Chiang Regime	1970 approx.	12,300,000
The Chiang Regime	1980 approx.	15,800,000
The Chiang Regime	1985 approx.	17,000,000

Source: Su Beng (2017), p. 31

Appendix 2:

Chinese Communist Artillery Fire: August 23-October 6

Island Names	Rounds	Rounds/Square Kilometer
Quemoy (Read as Kinmen)	237,838	1.46
Little Quemoy (Read as Little Kinmen)	117,149	7.55
Ta-Tan (Read as Dan-Dan)	92,469	117.00
Erh-tan (Reas as Erh Dan)	27,454	98.00

Source: Report of Taiwan USARPC Advisory Team on the Artillery Situations on the Offshore Islands, October 30, 1958, To: CINCUSARPAC, TDC #3480 (Secret).

Table 20: M.H.Halperin. (1966). *The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History (U)*. RAND Corporation. RAND Corporation. (Pg. 310)

Appendix 3:

List of Taiwan's Presidents since 1948

Sl. No.	Name of the President	Beginning of the Term	End of the Term
1	Chiang Kai-shek	20 May 1948	5 April 1978
2	Yen Chia-kan	5 April 1975	20 May 1978
3	Chiang Ching-kuo	20 May 1978	13 January 1988
4	Lee Teng-hui	13 January 1988	20 May 2000
5	Chen Shui-bian	20 May 2000	20 May 2008
6	Ma Ying-jeou	20 May 2008	20 May 2016
7	Tsai Ing-wen	20 May 2016	Incumbent (term expires on 20 May 2024)

Source: Open Source

Appendix 4:

List of China's Presidents since 1949

Sl. No.	Name of the President	Beginning of the Term	End of the Term
1	Mao Zedong	1 October 1949	27 April 1959
2	Liu Shaoqi	27 April 1959	31 October 1968
3	Soong Ching-ling	31 October 1968	24 February 1972
4	Dong Biwu	31 October 1968	17 January 1975
5	Soong Ching-ling (Honorary President)	16 May 1981	29 May 1981
6	Zhu De	17 January 1975	6 July 1976
7	Soong Ching-ling	6 July 1976	5 March 1978
8	Ye Jianying	5 March 1978	18 June 1983
9	Li Xiannian	18 June 1983	8 April 1988
10	Yang Shangkun	8 April 1988	27 March 1993
11	Jiang Zemin	27 March 1993	15 March 1993
12	Hu Jintao	15 March 1993	14 March 2013
13	Xi Jinping	14 March 2013	Incumbent

Source: Open Source

Appendix 5:

Brief Timeline of Major Events in the Cross-Strait and Formosa-Taiwan

1557	Portuguese sailors passed through Taiwan Strait and named the island “Ilha Formosa”
1604	Appearance of Dutch in the Penghu (Pescadores) Island
1624	Dutch occupation of Taiwan begins
1661	Dutch rule ended by Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga)
1681	Koxinga’s grandson surrendered to Qing Empire’s general
1683	Taiwan Became a prefecture of Fujian province.
1887	Establishment of Taiwan province.
1895	Treaty of Shimonoseki-Begin of Japan’s rule over Taiwan post First Sino-Japanese War
1945	Japan surrendering its colonies
1947	228 Incident leading to massive arrests and killings by ROC forces in Taiwan.
1949	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People’s Republic of China (PRC) founded in Mainland China. • KMT evacuates to Taiwan. • UN recognises ROC as sole legitimate representative of China. • Martial law is imposed from 1949 to 1987 by ROC
1952	Treaty of Taipei
1954	First Taiwan Strait Crisis
1958	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Second Taiwan Strait Crisis • Bombings began in Kinmen islands
1971	UN Resolution 2758, recognising PRC as the

	legitimate representative of China
1972	<i>Shanghai Communique</i> , US acknowledges that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China.
1979	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>US-PRC Joint Communique</i>, recognises the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China. • <i>Taiwan Relations Act</i> passed, which provided a legal basis for unofficial US-Taiwan relations and provides commitments to Taiwan's security and support through arms sales.
1982	<i>US-PRC Joint Communique</i> , declares US intent to gradually decrease arm sales to Taiwan. US Six Assurances policy promises to continue US support to Taiwan.
1992	"1992 Consensus" signed between ROC and PRC representatives
1993	First White Paper released by PRC aiming Taiwan
1996	Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Second White Paper released by PRC aiming Taiwan • National Unification Council of Taiwan was abolished by President Chen Shui-bian
2005	PRC Anti-Secession Law mentions usage of force against Taiwan if independence is declared.
2006	Scrapping of the National Unification Council by Taiwan.
2008	Wild Strawberry Movement
2014	Sunflower Student Movement leading to the occupy the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) and

	halting of the enforcement of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement.
2015	Ma Ying-jeou meets Xi Jinping in Singapore, the first ever cross-Strait leaders meeting post 1949.
2016	Launch of New Southbound Policy (NSP)
August 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei • Live military drills by PRC
10 August 2022	Third White Paper released by PRC aiming Taiwan
13 January 2024	Presidential Elections in Taiwan

ⁱ The author has taken the liberty to use some of his own experience of closely watching important events in Taiwan during his stay for over 6 years while travelling extensively particularly in the rural areas.

ⁱⁱ Also known as Koxinga.

ⁱⁱⁱ The subjects were aimed to be transformed into kōminka- complete Japanaization of the colonial population.

^{iv} The government formed by Nationalists under KMT party was known as Republic of China (ROC).

^v Commonly known as “Blue” party.

^{vi} Also known as Quemoy.

^{vii} RAND Corporation data- Page 310 Total Artillery shells fired per km².

^{viii} Commonly known as “Green” Party.

^{ix} Taiwan’s Legislative body, equivalent to India’s Parliament.

^x These countries are: 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); 8 South Asians; Australia, and New Zealand.

^{xi} The list includes: São Tomé and Príncipe (2016), Panama (2017), Dominican Republic (2018), Burkina Faso (2018), El Salvador (2018), Solomon Islands (2019), Kiribati (2019), Nicaragua (2021), Honduras (2023).

^{xii} It is called "9-in-1" because voters in Taiwan’s 22 cities and counties vote for nine local government posts, including city mayors, county magistrates, and members of city and county councils.

^{xiii} The two terms are: 2016-2020; 2020-2024

^{xiv} Served as Taipei Mayor from 2014-2022.

^{xv} In the author’s experience, during the 2018 “9-in-1” elections and Presidential election campaigns, primarily most the news and print media covered their prime time with Kuo-yu election campaigns.

^{xvi} These Special Economic Zones were in: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen

^{xvii} A warfare which seeks to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favourable to own political-military-economic objectives. (Stokes & Hsiao, 2013, p. 3)

^{xviii} In author's contacts he is aware of multiple acquaintances who moved to China for higher salary and preferential policies towards Taiwanese.

^{xix} As per Taiwan's National Immigration Agency (NIA) data as of March 2023, Indonesia has 250,249; Vietnam has 233,429; the Philippines has 150,000, and Thailand has 73,818 workers registered in Taiwan.

^{xx} Vinod C. Khanna was the first Director General of the India-Taipei Association, the de facto Indian Mission in Taiwan.

^{xxi} Taiwan and China call it Taiping. In Western name it is Ittu Abba. Also claimed by Vietnam (Ba Binh) and the Philippines (Ligao/Pulo ng Ligaw).

About the Author

Dr. Manoj Kumar Panigrahi is currently an Assistant Professor and co-Director of the Centre for Northeast Asia Studies, in Jindal School of International Affairs at O.P. Jindal Global University. He is also a Non-Residential Research Fellow at Taiwan NextGen Foundation, Taipei. He teaches courses on Taiwanese History and Politics, Cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China, East Asian Politics, and Peace-making in Ethnic Conflicts. He has recently published a co-edited book titled, “Drifts and Dynamics: Russia's Ukraine War and Northeast Asia”. He also writes articles in Taipei Times, Taiwan Insight by the University of Nottingham, Air University, DSA, and other platforms. He has received the Best Scholarship Recipient Student award from Taiwan's Ministry of Education Scholarship (2016-2020) because of his passion for sharing Indian culture at the grassroots level in over 100 schools delivering more than 300 lectures during his Doctoral studies.



Printed & published by:
India Foundation, New Delhi
mail@indiafoundation.in
(For private circulation only)