

## The Colonial Debris of Bandung

### *Equality and Facilitating the Rise of the Hindu Right in India*

RATNA KAPUR

“The despised, the insulted, the hurt, the dispossessed – in short, the underdogs of the human race were meeting. Here were class and racial and religious consciousness on a global scale . . . This meeting of the rejected was in itself a kind of judgment upon the Western world!”<sup>1</sup>

“One day everybody is themselves – and the next day they are Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian. People shrink, dwindling into symbols.”<sup>2</sup>

#### INTRODUCTION

In April 1955, a gathering of 29 nations and more than 600 delegates at Bandung met to articulate a third way of operating within the existing global order that Cold War alliances were shaping. This effort combined the nationalist urges of Asian and African countries, the common goal of which was to struggle against colonialism, racism, and discrimination, and to fight for equality for all.

While these noble endeavors continue to inform the spirit of the constitutions of a number of countries present at Bandung, sixty years later, scholars have increasingly questioned whether the values that infused Bandung with a sense of purpose and progress have boomeranged. This chapter examines how conservative and right-wing forces have used the modernist ideals of challenging racism and discrimination, as well as securing equality, in the postcolonial context to set up a relationship with their own citizens on terms that are precisely reminiscent of the colonial encounter. The seeds for this enterprise are found in the anticolonial, anti-Western framing of the Bandung

<sup>1</sup> Richard Wright, *The Colour Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1956).

<sup>2</sup> B. Kidwai, *Cracking India* (London: Milkweed Editions, 1991), p. 93.

Conference, where newly formed nation-states sought to establish themselves as part of a distinct cultural and national project.

This chapter discusses a central paradox of Bandung: how the embrace of universal human rights, and specifically the right to equality for all,<sup>3</sup> is set in tension with an emphasis on Bandung's distinct anticolonial, non-Western, cultural, and civilizational formation.<sup>4</sup> This tension between equality and difference plays out not only externally, where the postcolonial nation-state asserts its distinct political and cultural position from the so-called West, but also internally in countries such as postcolonial India, where it produced the very politics of exclusion and subordination of the other – specifically religious minorities – which was a core feature of colonial governance. This feature thus implicates Bandung in the colonial debris that lies scattered in the sensibilities of the postcolonial present.

The values of Bandung, celebrated as a point of arrival for newly independent nation-states and freedom from colonial rule, obscured the imperial effects or dark side that shadowed this moment. These effects weave their way through the body and soul of a nation-state and leave their mark in tangible, albeit elusive, ways. While India embraced the project of human rights, including liberal equality, as a central feature of the modern liberal democratic state, the architecture of this right is shaped against the historical backdrop of the colonial encounter, which nurtured a cultural nationalism that enabled the articulation of the nation-state as distinctly Hindu, distinct from the West and the former colonial power.<sup>5</sup> In this understanding, the right to equality of religious minorities became contingent on either assimilating to Hindu majoritarianism by surrendering their distinct cultural and religious identity or risking exclusion, incarceration, and even annihilation for failing to comply.

The paradox presented at Bandung, between an anticolonial nationalism and equality, was not a recipe for a radical politics. The work of two of the early ideologues of the Hindu Right, V. D. Savarkar and M. S. Golwalkar, illustrates how this paradox partly facilitates the rise of the Hindu Right and its ability to justify Hindu majoritarianism in and through the discourse of equality. The judiciary increasingly validates the Hindu Right's version of equality and, in the process, Hindu majoritarianism. The end result is not a

<sup>3</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (ed.), "Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)," *Asia-Africa Speak from Bandung*, Section C, p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Final Communiqué," Section B, pp. 4–6.

<sup>5</sup> A. Vajpeyi, *Righteous Republic: The Political Foundations of Modern India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

betrayal of the Bandung dream, but rather a manifestation of the dark side that constituted part of that vision.

#### CULTURAL DISTINCTION AND THE RISE OF THE HINDU NATION

The Bandung Conference was partly an expression of the reassertion of the distinct traditional cultures and religions that colonial rule had tried to reform, marginalize, or eradicate. In the context of the modern world, the Conference called for a renewal of ancient Asian and African cultures and religions, which were seen as thwarted in their development for centuries as a result of colonial rule.<sup>6</sup> At the cultural level, the construction of an Asian voice was a unifying force set in opposition to the West in terms of race, religion, and culture. This effort to identify and embrace what was distinct from the West had the effect of calling for a return to a precolonial, precolonized era, and excavation of what was truly authentic.

Jawaharlal Nehru embodied this vision of a nation as distinct from the West, and in Bandung was regarded as projecting a culturally superior attitude induced by a “conscious identification with an ancient civilization.”<sup>7</sup> This vision became prescient of the ways in which fundamentalist and deeply conservative forces would repeat the colonial effects of governance in response to their religious minorities. Within postcolonial India, culture, religion, and race were deployed in contradistinction not only to the Christian West but also to the religious other, specifically the Muslim. Both of these moves were essential to establishing a distinct national identity.

While Nehru and the Indian National Congress party struggled to find ways to balance the diverse segments of the population in the nationalist project, the Hindu Mahasabha – a nationalist organization founded in 1914 that campaigned for Hindu political unity – took advantage of this political indeterminacy by firmly and forcefully emphasizing that the life of the sovereign state could only be construed and representative of a portion of its citizenry: the Hindus.<sup>8</sup> The most influential early exponent of this position was

<sup>6</sup> Wright, *The Colour Curtain*, p. 204.

<sup>7</sup> C. P. Romulo, *The Meaning of Bandung* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956), pp. 11–12.

<sup>8</sup> The establishment of the Hindu Mahasabha was partly in response to the rise of the Muslim League, which was increasingly seeking a separate homeland. The Mahasabha supported Hindu political unity, including education and economic development for Hindus as well as the reconversions of Muslims to Hinduism. It was also opposed to the secularism envisaged by the Congress under Nehru based on the wall of separation between religion and the state.

V. D. Savarkar, president of the Hindu Mahasabha.<sup>9</sup> Savarkar argued that the inimitable Indian state formation was to be crystallized through the energies of Hindus to pursue a distinct sovereign form that was founded and articulated in conflict with the emerging idea of Pakistan as well as the Indian Republic as envisioned by Nehru. While Savarkar and Nehru were opposed to every manifestation of empire, their positions diverged on how the newly emerging nation-state was going to assert its autonomy and identity.<sup>10</sup>

Nehru and the Congress party were intent on establishing a British model of governance, where sovereignty was equated with a coming together of “consensual political will, paternalistic protection, and a universal democratic citizenry’s inalienable right to life.”<sup>11</sup> In contrast, Savarkar’s ideology was based on the commonality of one section of the citizenry:

[T]he life of a nation is the life of that portion of its citizens whose interests and history and aspirations are most closely bound up with the land and who thus provide the real foundation to the structure of their national state . . . So with the Hindus, they being the people whose past, present, and future are most closely bound with the soil of Hindusthan as *Pitribhu* [Fatherland], as *Punyabhū* [Holyland], they constitute the foundation, the bedrock, *the reserved forces of the Indian State*.<sup>12</sup>

Savarkar’s pamphlet was published when the Hindu Mahasabha was in the midst of developing a response to the government’s 1909 Minto-Moreley reforms.<sup>13</sup> These reforms gave separate electorates to candidates who mobilized under the banner of the Muslim League.<sup>14</sup> The Act became a precursor to the two-nation theory that garnered strength as Muslims in India became increasingly uncomfortable with the idea of being a minority in a free and independent India. The Congress Party attempted to maneuver this tension through an alliance with the League and the conceptualization of an Undivided India (Akhand Bharat). In contrast, the Hindu Mahasabha’s intervention opposed the secular balance that Congress advocated, and identified Hindus as a distinct race with an originary way of life and cultural values. This

<sup>9</sup> V. D. Savarkar, *Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu*, 6th ed. (Delhi: Bharti Sahitya Sadan, 1989).

<sup>10</sup> S. Sarkar, *Beyond Nationalist Frames: Postmodernism, Hindu Fundamentalism, History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); S. Sarkar, T. Basu, and T. Sarkar, *Khaki Shorts and Saffron Flags: A Critique of the Hindu Right* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993).

<sup>11</sup> M. Basu, “Fathers of a still-born past: Hindu empire, globality and the rhetoric of the trikaal,” Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh (2008).

<sup>12</sup> Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p. 139. <sup>13</sup> Indian Councils Act 1909.

<sup>14</sup> The All India Muslim League was founded in 1906 by Aga Khan III. Its subsequent leaders proposed the creation of separate Muslim India. This demand was formally made in 1940 under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in the form of Pakistan.

ideological stand, articulated as Hindutva, was the basis of the distinct national identity and homeland that the Hindu Mahasabha espoused.

Savarkar emphasized that Hindutva and Hinduness were political concepts, and that Hindutva was different from Hinduism.

[W]hen we attempt to investigate into the essential significance of Hindutva we do not primarily – and certainly not mainly – concern ourselves with any particular theocratic or religious dogma or creed. Had not linguistic usage stood in our way then “Hinduness” would have certainly been a better word than Hinduism as a near parallel to Hindutva. Hindutva embraces all the departments of thought and activity of the whole being of our Hindu role.<sup>15</sup>

Savarkar used the argument of Hindutva and Hinduness as distinct from Hinduism as a means for establishing superiority of the Hindu race rather than religion. According to Savarkar, “Hindus are not merely the citizens of the Indian state because they are united not only by the bonds of love they bear to a common motherland but also by the bonds of a common blood.”<sup>16</sup> This definition thus classifies a Hindu in racial terms. But Savarkar did not stop at this concept of a common fatherland and a common racial bond. Rather, he saw a Hindu as one who inherits Indian civilization and shares a common cultural heritage as well as religion, namely Hinduism. In Savarkar’s definition, a Hindu is a “person who regards the land of Bharatvarsha from Indus to the East as his Fatherland as well as his Holyland – that is the cradle of his religion.”<sup>17</sup> Through this elision of the fatherland and the Holyland, Savarkar constructs the political category of Hindu in opposition to non-Hindus, particularly Muslims and Christians, who shared a common fatherland but located their Holyland outside India. A Hindu race was constructed by continuously posting a conflict between the Hindu and others, most notably the “Muslim invader.” Thus, while Savarkar was emphatic that Hindutva was distinct from Hinduism, his writings make clear that Hinduism was an important part of being Hindu. Despite the emphasis on racial distinctions, the difference of religion remained as a constituting moment of the oppositional identities. This position is similar to how the Bandung Final Communiqué blends religion and civilization. Both Hindutva and Bandung had a cultural other: Muslims and the West, respectively.

M. S. Golwalkar further articulated the definition of the Hindu Nation (Hindu Rashtra).<sup>18</sup> Golwalkar’s vision of a Hindu nation included five

<sup>15</sup> Savarkar, *Hindutva*, pp. 3–4.   <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115–116.   <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116.

<sup>18</sup> Madhav Sadhashiv Golwalkar was an active member of the RSS, the ideological wing of the Hindu Right. He became the second Supreme Chief (Sarsangchalak) of the RSS from 1940 to

components: geography or country, race, religion, culture, and language.<sup>19</sup> He argued that the Hindus qualified under each of these categories and thus constituted a nation. “Hindustan, the land of the Hindus ... a definite geographical entity” constitutes a country. “[T]he Hindu Race is united together by common traditions ... memories ... culture ... language ... [and] customs,” and thus constitutes a race.<sup>20</sup> On religion and culture he stated that Hinduism is the “only religion in the world worthy of being so denominated, which in its variety is still an organic whole.”<sup>21</sup> Through this religion, “the Race evolved a culture which despite the degenerating contact with the debased ‘civilisations’ of the Mussalmans and the Europeans, for the last ten centuries, is still the noblest in the world.”<sup>22</sup> Golwalkar concluded, “this country, Hindustan, the Hindu Race with its Hindu Religion, Hindu, Culture, and Hindu Language, complete the Nation concept.”<sup>23</sup>

While Hindutva is, at one level, a project of cultural, racial, and linguistic homogenization, it is also articulated as a geographical project. “Hindustan, the land of the Hindus, is a definite geographical unity” that constitutes a country.<sup>24</sup> While Bandung can be understood as a state-building project to seize power from the West, Hindutva is a state-building project designed to exclude or erase the Muslim other.

Despite Golwalkar’s insistence on the distinct nature of the five categories, the entire definition of the Hindu Nation is derived from the common religion of Hinduism. Race is defined in terms of a common culture. And culture is in turn defined almost wholly in terms of a common religion, since in Golwalkar’s view religion and culture for the Hindus are virtually indistinguishable. Country is simply the geographical territory occupied by people united by religion, culture, and race. Language, similarly, is spoken by people united by religion, culture, and race. The priority of religion within this construct reveals that the appeal for a Hindu Nation is very much an appeal to religion.

In Golwalkar’s discussion, those who were not a part of the Hindu Race still had a chance to be a part of the Hindu Nation if they abandoned their differences; adopted the religion, culture, and language of the Hindu Nation; and completely merged themselves in the national race.<sup>25</sup> Thus the call for

1973 and a major exponent of the ideological doctrine to establish India as a Hindu State (Rashtra). He called on the religious minorities to give up their “foreign mental complexion and merge in the common stream of our national life.” M. S. Golwalkar, *We or Our Nationhood Defined* (New Delhi: Bharat Prakashan, 1939); J. Sharma, *Terrifying Vision: M.S. Golwalkar, the RSS and India* (New York: Penguin, Viking, 2007).

<sup>19</sup> Golwalkar, *Nationhood Defined*, p. 18. <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40. <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43. <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45–46. <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40. <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

assimilation was, first and foremost, a call for religious assimilation, for minorities to return to the folds of Hinduism. It was only a secondary call to assimilate into the culture and race, insofar as this culture and race is derivative of the religious category. Golwalkar makes clear that those religious minorities who failed to assimilate must “lose their separate existence to merge in the Hindu race, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu Nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment – *not even citizen’s rights*.”<sup>26</sup> The Hindu Nation was thus constituted in the writings of Golwalkar through an expression of enmity to religious minorities.

These conceptualizations of the Hindu Nation continue to inform the political agenda of the Hindu Right today. The contemporary ideologues of the Hindu Right continue to emphasize a distinction between Hindu and Hinduism, and to insist that Hindu is an attitude of allegiance. The supremacy of Hinduism remains the basis of the political claims against the minorities, who follow religions that allow neither toleration nor secularism. And in the process, Hindu majoritarianism comes to constitute the basic scaffolding of the right to equality. Within this context, the campaign to construct a Ram temple in Ayodhya has acquired such importance and the religious nature of the political rhetoric of the Hindu Right has become most evident.

#### CONFLUENCE OF EQUALITY AND RELIGIOUS MAJORITY

In the Ayodhya campaign, the Hindu Right sought to have the sixteenth-century Babri Masjid mosque replaced with a Hindu temple. This campaign has proved to be enormously successful in generating broad-based support for the Hindu Right. The Hindu Right alleged that the mosque was built on the site of the birth of the Hindu god Ram and demanded that it be removed, and that a temple commemorating the birth of Ram be built in its place. The campaign succeeded in mobilizing thousands of supporters, some of whom followed the marchers to Ayodhya, while many others sent money and bricks to help construct the new temple. On December 6, 1992, mobs of the Hindu Right destroyed the Babri Masjid, triggering massive communal riots around the country in which thousands of people were killed.

Despite the national outcry condemning the Hindu Right, and the role of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the destruction and the violence that followed in its wake, the political momentum of the BJP continued to grow.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 47–48; emphasis added.

In the 1996 national elections, the BJP emerged as the largest single political party and was invited to form the government. Unable to secure the support required to form a coalition government, the BJP government fell within two weeks. But the enormous increase in its popularity among the Indian electorate could not be ignored. In the 1998 elections, following the collapse of the United Front government (an unstable alliance of India's regional parties and the Left, with Congress supporting the coalition from the outside), the BJP again emerged as the largest single party and successfully formed a coalition government (the National Democratic Alliance) that governed from 1999 to 2004. The BJP was again voted out of power in the 2004 elections, after presiding over the worst communal riots since independence, in Gujarat in 2002, where Narendra Modi was the state's chief minister. However, in May 2014, the BJP was elected with a majority government after ten years of rule by the United Progressive Alliance, a coalition led by the Congress Party. Narendra Modi, a former lobbyist (*pracharak*) of *Hindutva* and member of the *Rashtriya Swayam Seva (RSS)*,<sup>27</sup> the Hindu Right's ideological wing, was appointed the new prime minister.

The 2014 elections signaled a major shift in the political and cultural constellation of India in the direction that early ideologues of the Hindu Right envisioned. The BJP's successful political inroads must be seen in the broader context of the discursive struggles of the Hindu Right, in which they have attempted to establish their vision of *Hindutva* as ideologically dominant – partly by using the very principles of equality as well as cultural distinction embraced by the Bandung Conference. Through their collective efforts, they have sought to naturalize the ideas of *Hindutva* by making them a part of the common sense of an increasingly large segment of Hindu society as well as by making inroads into the constitutional definition of equality and secularism, which has received judicial sanction.

In the contemporary political terrain, *Hindutva* continues to be a political category that is distinct from the religion of Hinduism but that relies on religion in constituting the political category of Hindu. It is opposite to the Nehruvian vision of the state as the sum of its fragments and one committed to a secular ideal based on a model separation of state and religion and state neutrality in all matters of religion. This model, based on the idea that religion could be exorcised from the body politic of a nation, seemed to contradict the underlying and unifying idea of the Bandung Conference, where those present sought to distinguish themselves from the West, partly

<sup>27</sup> National Volunteer Organization.

through the reassertion of their distinct cultural and religious values as set out in the Final Communiqué. Both Hindutva and Bandung draw on the logic of formal equality (read as: sameness under the unifying banner of a culturally distinct national identity) as well as difference (read as: distinction from the West as well as a religious other). This understanding of equality has also influenced the Hindu Right's understanding of secularism within the Indian context.

At the point of Independence, the Hindu Right endorsed the Gandhian model of secularism based on the equal treatment of all religions.<sup>28</sup> Like the liberal democratic vision of secularism, the Indian model is based on equality and freedom of religion. However, toleration displaces the third principle of the liberal vision, neutrality, in the Indian model.<sup>29</sup> The Hindu Right has used this model of secularism based on the equal treatment of all religions to argue in favor of a formal model of equality based on sameness; that is, to treat all of India's religious communities the same. This model is used to attack so-called special treatment accorded to the religious minorities under the Indian Constitution as appeasement and a violation of the principle of equality, while simultaneously using the right to entrench Hindu majoritarianism. The Hindu Right has sought to cast themselves as the true inheritors of India's secular tradition or the promoters of genuine secularism that demands "justice for all and appeasement for none." Its success in infusing the constitutional principles of equality and secularism in ways that have been consistent with its vision of Hindutva was evident in the Hindutva cases (1996) of the Indian Supreme Court as well as the Allahabad High Court's decision (2010) in suits filed with respect to a disputed area of land in Ayodhya, where the Hindu Right parties have sought to construct a Ram temple. These judgments need to be situated within the broader context of the discursive struggles of the Hindu Right and its efforts to legitimize its vision of Hindu supremacy as well as the articulation of the free and independent India as a Hindu nation-state.

<sup>28</sup> The "equal treatment of all religions" is a model of secularism that does not require a wall of separation between religion and politics. Engineer Asghar Ali, "Secularism in India – Theory and Practice," in Rudolf C. Heredia and Edward Mathias (eds.), *Secularism and Liberation: Perspectives and Strategies for India Today* (New Delhi: Indian Social Institute, 1995), p. 40.

<sup>29</sup> The separation thesis was rejected partly on the grounds that it was a distinctly Western concept. At the same time, the secularism project was also deeply implicated in the formulation of nationalism, which provided a counter to the challenges posed by Muslims and other disadvantaged groups as well as to British colonial discourses. Shabnum Tejani, *Indian Secularism: A Social and Intellectual History, 1890–1950* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2007).

The Indian Supreme Court has played a critical role in defining the content of religion, where ideas of nationalism as well as Hindu majoritarianism increasingly converge, and in the process establish the contours of secularism and the formal model of equality on which it is based. The most famous decisions the court delivered in 1996 were in the *Hindutva* cases.<sup>30</sup> In these cases, several speeches of Shiv Sena/BJP candidates during a state election campaign in 1987 were challenged as appealing to religion to gain votes and in the process promote religious enmity in violation of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act of 1951. Although the court found several of the accused guilty, it also held that *Hindutva* – the ideological linchpin of the Hindu Right – simply represented “a way of life of people of the subcontinent.”

According to the court, *Hindutva* could not be equated with or understood as religious fundamentalism or as a depiction of an attitude hostile to persons practicing other religions. Rather, *Hindutva* was used to promote secularism by emphasizing the way of life of the Indian people and the Indian culture, or to criticize the policy of any political party that was discriminatory or intolerant. It held that appealing to *Hindutva* was neither an appeal to religion nor a promotion of religious hatred, and thus was not a violation of the Act.

The decision illustrates how secularism comes to be equated with majoritarianism through *Hindutva*. The court’s conclusion on the meaning of *Hindutva* is legally, historically, and politically unsupportable. The writings of the ideological leaders discussed previously reveal how *Hindutva* is the mental state or attitude of the Hindu race and the Hindu nation – a race and a nation that are, at their very core, about religion. And the minorities are constructed as the enemies or threat to this Hindu nation.

Fourteen years later, on September 30, 2010, the Allahabad High Court decided largely in favor of the Hindu parties in a series of suits filed to determine the legal title to a plot of land on which they have sought to build a Ram temple – precisely on the spot where the Babri mosque once stood. While the case is complicated,<sup>31</sup> all the judges seemed to agree that worship at the site constituted a core ingredient for the Hindu faith, and, in the words of one judge, to disallow prayer would be “to extinguish the very religion.”<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> For the purpose of brevity I refer to the lead case, *Dr. Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kasinath Kunte and Ors.* (1995) S.C.A.L.E. 1.

<sup>31</sup> R. Kapur, “A Leap of Faith: The Construction of Hindu Majoritarianism through Secular Law” (2014), 113 *South Atlantic Quarterly* at 109–128.

<sup>32</sup> *Visharad v. Ahmad*, O.O.S., No. 1 of 1989, All. H.C., 4 (2010) (opinion of Sharma, J., volume 4), p. 121.

## CONCLUSION

The principles of equality and recognition of cultural and civilizational differences set out in the Bandung Final Communiqué are inherently in tension. Bandung employed a universalism that was expressed in terms of an imagined “renewal” of a pre-imperial cultural and spiritual alliance among African and Asian nations, despite their differences, to distinguish themselves from the West and former colonial powers. Yet, the Bandung principles (and international law) also recognized the equality of all races and people. How was this tension between cultural universalism and the principle of equality to be resolved? This paradox of Bandung foregrounds the possibility of a Hindu state through its adoption of the universal principles of human rights, including the right to equality, while also recognizing the cultural and civilizational distinction of those countries present from the West as well as from the Muslim other.

The Hindu Right has secured an ideological grip within legal discourse where their successful engagements with the discourses of equality and secularism have been powerful and persuasive. And the judicial decisions are increasingly reflecting the influence of this discursive strategy, where secularism has come to be equated with *Hindutva*, the ideological core of the Hindu Right, and equality with sameness in treatment. This narrowing of the understanding of equality has enabled more violence against religious minorities, justified in terms of self-defense, and has set up such minorities as opposed to the secularism, equality, and basic values of the constitution.

The chapter highlights some of the less perceptible effects of the colonial encounter, which operated through the ecologies of governance in and through liberal rights. These effects do not amount to a wholesale embrace of colonial technologies,<sup>33</sup> but rather a reformulation and reordering of the art of governance in the management of religious minorities, while also constituting the very identity of the modern nation-state. The durabilities of these forms of governance are mutated in the postcolonial present, and are less visible and hence more insidious in remaining less identifiable.

<sup>33</sup> A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).