

Iran, the UAE, and International Law: A Tumultuous Timeline

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Introduction

Peacefully resolving disputes over territory constitutes an important goal for the international community as issues of sovereignty continue to cause friction between states, and many of these conflicts remain unresolved (Huth, 1996). The legal associations among various city-states date back to treaties of commerce, diplomatic ties, and mechanisms of military deterrence. The relations that dwelled upon international regulations, created a highly developed system of laws concerning the integrity and sovereignty among countries. Treaties of commerce, coinage agreements, treaties enabling many different kinds of claims to be enforced in the courts, and a highly-developed system of diplomatic missions gave rise to a fairly effective organization of international relations (Amerasinghe, 2001). Owing to the establishment of political order around the globe and the growth of democratic ideals, the need for peaceful negotiations to end war and rivalry was felt. The international peace-keeping forces, however, remained centric to the notions of First World. Such nature of the international conventions and treaties have gathered much intellect attention which aims at examining the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the settlement of territorial disputes among the Islamic States which function on historical and Islamic core values of faith for the promulgation of justice.

Issues such as annexation and land disputes have daunted the Middle-East for decades owing to its geopolitical and strategic importance. While it cannot be denied that during the formation of the earlier Islamic states, there were some forms of divisions of territories, one of the chief

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principles of Islamic law is not to separate Islamic states from other states of international legal and political communities (Malekian, 2011). However, post imperialism and during the Cold War years, these States underwent drastic political upheavals which altered the demographic and social trends. The change in trend was signified by the increased economic importance of oil-rich regions. To date, many Islamic nations struggle for autonomous nationhood and aim at establishing harmonious relations with the neighbouring nations, thereby seeking freedom from repetitive political breakdowns and military control. One such prevalent trend is set by the territorial distress between United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran. The long-standing, yet low-intensity, the dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over the ownership of the three islands predates the 1979 Islamic Revolution (Majidyar, 2018).

The article aims at analysing the contours of the territorial dispute which has led to meddling of the international forums but no substantive solutions have come about to unravel the ever evolving and persisting issues. International law puts into force a perspective which enables deeper analysis given the historical context of the Islamic States, along with their strategic significance. It is pertinent to mention that the Westernised perceptions of the East which in-builds a rather “exotic image” of these disputes remain intrinsic to the analysis from an international legal lens owing to the Eurocentric regulations.

Pontius Pilate Solution: an analysis of historical claims over the disputed islands

The historiography of the contentious invasion of the islands reveals series of nuanced versions of complex negotiations between the British, Ras Al Khaimah, Sharjah and Tehran over conflicting demands of control and sovereignty. The Abu Musa Island accounts for good percentage of oil reserves due to which the economies of UAE and Iran remain dependent upon the control of these islands. The location of islands in the Strait of Hormuz, the mouth of the Persian Gulf could allow a country to influence the Gulf's valuable shipping lane, or even to close off the Gulf all together (Mandala Projects , 1997). The strategic location of islands substantiates the existing interests of other nations in the region. The dispute essentially formulates the issue of ownership of these islands which indulges the scholarship pertaining to the period before British rule and when the British announced its departure.

The historical claims over the islands can be scrutinized through set of literature from Iranian standpoint and the Arabian claims over the islands. The scholars who support the Iranian claims

over the islands usually tend to associate the Persian empires with the political geography of Eastern Arabia in terms of political development in the entire region (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 2006). For instance, Guive Mirfendereski, a lawyer who supports Iran's claim to the islands, writes, "the political and commercial domination of Iran over the Persian Gulf in the Seleucial (312-150 BC), Parthian (238 BC-224 AD), and Sassanid (224-641 AD) period points to the conclusion that in pre-Islamic times the [Tunbs] and Abu Musa most likely [emphasis added] belonged to Iran" (Mirfenderski, 1996). On the other hand, the scholars who support the Arab claim reiterate their disagreement with the Persian claims and mandate the analysis of anthropological data which states that the Gulf became a purely "Arab lake" with the Islamic conquests in the seventh century AD (Roken, 2001). Further, even when the Caliphate declined, local powers such as that of Oman controlled the islands and exercised sovereignty. Both versions of the history possess contradictory claims but the prime issue rests in the absence of surviving evidence of the historical claims. The existence of mere assumptions by various historiographers does not substantially account for furtherance of claims in the eyes of law.

The references for the claims find its inception in the British documentations and the preservation of these evidences indicate the diplomatic interests of the British in the region. In 1968, the imperial British power announced withdrawal from the Gulf by the end of 1971 which is remarked has the initiation of the dispute over the three-islands. It was observed by Richard Schofield that:

"At that time, Iran pressed claims for Bahrain based on its majority population of Shia Muslims along with the presence of ethnic Iranians. However, the people of Bahrain voted for independence, achieving it on August 15, 1971. In the case of Bahrain, Iran argued a recurrent theme in territorial matters – that other countries had conspired against Iran. According to this argument, Mohammed Reza Shah wanted Abu Musa and the Tunbs as a political consideration after losing Bahrain." (Schofield, 2002)

Kourosh Ahmadi through his book titled *Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf* describes how for 170 years Britain eroded Iranian influence in the Gulf, both directly by asserting colonial rule over Iranian islands and port districts, and also through claiming Iranian islands for their protégés on the Arab littoral (Ahmadi, 2008). Given the pretext of Britain's withdrawal, the islands constituted as mere pawn in the loathing conflict which had eroded the relations between the nationalists and radicals of Arab against monarchical rein of Iran, and decades later the animosity turned conservative-moderate Arab against the Islamic Iran.

However, the failure to resolve the sovereignty issue in 1971 set the stage for the dispute that exploded when Tehran asserted its control over the island in 1992 (Mobley, 2003).

While the issue remained ancillary to the British, it became pertinent to settle the dispute over the islands before the official departure owing to the increasingly inflexible nature of Sharjah and issuing of public threat to seize the islands, which further inculcated the need to tie loose ends, keeping in perspective the future of Bahrain, Qatar and Trucial States (Parsons, 1991). The British pondered upon Pontius Pilate solution which called for joint civil administration over the island by the two regional powers. Series of complex negotiations, resulted in signing of Memorandum between Tehran and Sharjah which had become part of United Arab Emirates (UAE). The memorandum rendered division of Abu Musa into two-portions and joint administration of the island by UAE and Iran. The MoU allowed Sharjah to establish a police station in the southern zone, while Iran was allowed to place military troops within the northern zone thereby agreeing to provide island's security.

The Annexation and Occupation of the Islands

The departure of the British was followed by Iranian occupation of Tunb Islands and partial control of Abu Musa. In-order to examine the claims over the Islands, it becomes pertinent to distinguish between conquest and occupation. Under International Law the former practice of conquest is considered to be inadequate for providing legitimate control of the territory. According to the 1907 Hague Regulation, occupation, occurs when a conqueror's forces actually take administrative control of conquered territory and the conquering state's control only extends to the actually occupied territories of the defeated opposing state (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009). The distinction between conquest and occupation is relevant in the context of Persia's initial official claims to the Tunbs and Abu Musa in the latter part of the nineteenth century (Al-Mazrouei, 2015). While it is true that the Persians conquered the Lingeh in 1887, they failed to occupy the disputed islands, which remained under the administrative control of the Al-Qawasim rulers of Ras Al-Khaimah and Sharjah (Al-Mazrouei, 2015). Thus, it was noted that Iranian occupation of the islands regarded disgraceful.

It is interesting to note that America and British never supported UAE's claim over the island when Iran remained strategic partner to both the countries and was subsequently perceived as the country which would replace Britain for security purposes. Various scholarships examined that ever since 1971 the Arab League supported UAE's claim while Britain believed that the

Islands were rightfully the territory of Iran. According to Anthony H. Cordesman, an expert on the Middle East who has worked at the US State Department, US Department of Energy, and the NATO International Staff:

Britain, which saw the Shah as the principal future source of stability in the Gulf, was not prepared to make an issue of the matter and an arrangement with Iran that would allow it to occupy the islands immediately after the British departure. The evidence is uncertain, but the presence of a British carrier in the immediate area during Iranian occupation, and a number of British actions, indicated British complicity in the Shah's invasion (Cordesman, 1984).

The contention with the super power did not arise at the time of occupation but only during the Iranian Revolution which was followed by bombing of the US embassies in Tehran. The government policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran remained adamant about the islands' ownership which fuelled the rivalry but this time even against Britain and America. The timeline that followed from the revolution encompassed Iraqi invasion of Iran in the year 1980 which threatened oil shipping in the Strait of Hormuz as Iran fired missiles at Iraqi and Kuwaiti ships from Abu Musa island (BBC News, 2005). In 1981 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established which supported Iraqi forces owing to the agenda regarding liberation of the islands. By 1982, the Iraqi forces were anticipated to lose the war, hence the nations of GCC who grew sceptical of Iranian retaliation made gestures to pacify the impact. For instance, the Saudi fear of Iranian retaliation against the GCC states' oil installations, because of Iraqi bombardments of its oil installations, led them to export refined petrochemical products to Iran to make up for the shortage (Zabih, 1976).

The events of 1992 signify the complete Iranian control of Abu Musa by directly alluding the MoU and annexing the portion which was previously under the control of Sharjah. According to Ayman Alouri and Brian O'Connell Iran prevented UAE citizens and residents from entering the island without obtaining an Iranian visa and even refused to provide urgent medical assistance or water to a large number of passengers including citizens and Arab teachers with their families (O'Connell, 2002). In September, the bilateral talks took place in Abu Dhabi between Iran and UAE but the talks broke down without any conclusive solution. The following December, the GCC supported a strategy of submitting the three islands dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if direct bilateral talks between the UAE and Iran could not be restarted, and demanded that Iran ends its occupation of the Tunbs (Al-Mazrouei, 2015). These events were followed by UAE's submission of the issue before the ICJ which were in-

turn supported by Arab League and several European nations such as Britain that had made no initial steps to estop the annexation. In 1995, the bilateral talks were held yet again in Doha but the uncompromising nature of Iran rendered the negotiations failed (European Union, 2004).

In present times, polarization of sectarian tensions in the Middle East which defines the realpolitik strategy and business strategy for states in the region has significantly influenced the island dispute. The phrase “sectarian tensions” refer to the politically and discursively framed rivalry between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. The politicization of sect, spearheaded by the Islamic states and Iran after the 1979 revolution, have mutated the salience of sect from a largely private spiritual matter into a political vehicle to realize state interests (Zahawi, 2016). Demographically, Iranian population constitutes for 90% Shia Muslim while UAE population largely comprises of 85% Sunni Muslim. This division may be regarded as a reason for failed international negotiations, owing to the regional policy establishment of the two regions.

According to European Council on Foreign affairs, two rivalry blocs can be identified in the Middle Eastern region based on the demographic distinction. Subsequently, it was reported that Iran appears to have intensified efforts to support its proxies in the region, fuelling sectarian tension and undermining the integrity of the nation state (Al-Ketbi, 2019). Above all, UAE is one of the founding members of the GCC, which seek to establish an “agenda of regional moderation” targeting two perceived threats: the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran. Thus, one of the major reasons behind failed international negotiations appears to be the outmost ignorance of need for cultural cooperation which the international law does not entail. The next section thrives to analyse the existing notions of international law through which the dispute may be resolved but over-all the absence of cultural-cooperation renders the mode of resolution meaningless or at times as coerced.

Setting a Peremptory Norm: *Jus cogens*

International law is very clear: annexation and territorial conquest are forbidden by the Charter of the United Nations,” said Michael Lynk, the UN Special Rapporteur... “The Security Council, beginning with Resolution 242 in November 1967, has expressly affirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war or force on eight occasions, most recently in 2016.” (United Nations Human Rights High Commission , 2019).

Legal jurists such as John Austin and other legal positivists claim that law, is an emanation of the command of a ‘political superior’ on a ‘political inferior’ or subordinate (Sucharitkul,

2010). Failure by the political inferior to obey his superior's command would result in a sanction being meted out to the inferior (Elliot, 1918). The command theory as developed by Austin essentialises the existence of element of "command" or "sanction" but the fact that there exists no central authority in the strict sense does not mean international law has no authority (Zongwe, 2019). The international law for instance, engages the functioning of UN Charter which allows the Security Council to authorize the use of force by states individually and/or collectively which even incorporates the power to establish peacekeeping missions in various countries (Zongwe, 2019).

The nation-states ascertain their support and will to bind by the prevailing international law by becoming signatory to the respective convention, but the scope and binding nature of the international law is not limited to this extent. The international law must comply with '*Jus Cogenes*' which are fundamental rules of customary international law to which all states become bound (Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties , 1969). It has been emphasised that a norm of general international law was not enough for the identification of jus cogens and that, in addition, there had to be acceptance and recognition (Tladi, 2018). To this relevance, nation-states over the decades have come realise the importance of sovereignty and the need to maintain strategic relations with other countries. Thus, with respect to annexation of occupied territories, the customary international law mandates absolute prohibition, resultant to which, all countries are bound to respect the sovereignty of each other.

In 2008, UAE celebrated completion of 37th Independence Day and yet again invited Iranian representative to resolve the Island dispute through ICJ referral owing to the failed bilateral negotiation and Iranian stance. Iran repeatedly notifies its tough stance and infers that with due support of GCC and Arab League, UAE's claims become persuasive even if the claims are false. It is to be inferred that despite the fact that Iran committed heinous act of annexation, the ideological and historical claims seem to be blurred in the light of the lobbied interests of UAE. The occupation of the Tunb Islands was in direct contravention with the principle of *Jus Cogenes* but the alternative of resorting to ICJ does not seem viable at the option of Iran to gather impartial judgement because the claim that Iran's occupation of the islands occurred as a result of "an unwritten understanding" is not persuasive in a legal sense (Sumner, 2004).

Flip Side of the Same Coin: examination of evidences presented by Iran and UAE

Before dwelling into the scope of International Law, it is relevant to scrutinize the claims made by Iranian representatives over the Islands as against the claims made by Arab nations. The legal arguments from both ends indicate the crucial role played by Britain. The representatives of Iran and the scholars who support the Iranian claim over the Islands argue through the lens of law of prescription. The argument goes that by the virtue of immemorial prescription Iran should be declared as the rightful owner. The prescription is based on the principle that if anyone uninterruptedly possessed a thing or right beyond the memory of man, he should be regarded as its lawful owner or holder (Sherman, 1911). The Iranian leadership has repeatedly claimed that centuries prior to British established imperialism in the Gulf, the Islands were under Persian control and the ownership should not be hindered owing to the absence or lack of written documentation. While Iranian scholars sometimes present documentation that refers to taxes collected by the Lingeh island (on the northern coast of the Gulf) authorities on behalf of Persia at Sirri Island from 1877 until 1887 but the evidences does not substantiate for a solid legal claim in terms of Abu Musa Island and mere Tunb Islands (Al-Mazrouei, 2015).

The ICJ in 2011 while according the sovereignty rights to Bahrain in Maritime and Territorial dispute of Hawar islands observed that “geographical contiguity” does not constitute for sufficient basis to claim sovereignty. UAE as of today enjoys the support of British and historical data complied to supplant the MoU previously signed between the two countries. The legal argument from UAE thereby follows that historical map and documents pertaining to taxes embody UAE as the rightful owner. As it will be discussed in the next section, interpretation of treaties by the ICJ enables the judgement to be perceived as sound and reasonable. To this extent, Iran claims, the MoU must be regarded as a document which should not be intervened by any third-party by its virtue along with the principle laid in law of prescription, Islands should belong to Iran. UAE as a counter response recapped that Sharjah was in-turned coerced into signing the MoU and Iranian claim over Abu Musa remains invalid by the virtue of Article 52 of Vienna Convention which states that: *“A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”* Maintenance of the claim of duress was accounted by the scholar Al-Moalla who argued that in the colonial period, the

ruler of Sharjah was forced to give up his territories, so, Iran could not claim its sovereignty over Abu Musa based on the MoU (Al-Moalla). Thus, even the treaty remains contentious.

International Law and Territorial Integrity of the Islands

The international law pertaining to the issue of annexation can be inferred from the Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations (UN Charter).

The UN Charter by the virtue of Article 2(4) prohibits unilateral use of force but the prohibition is read in context with Article 51, which recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” (Franck, 2001). The drafters were keen on including the “inherent right of self-defence” to enable the implication of stand-by forces of the countries. However, this suggests that in response to an armed attack, the action by the victim state should be “immediate” and not planned. The charter recognises the rational approach to war scenes and does not provide scope for armed attack to in-turn become a response or revenge tactic.

Owing to the context of Article 2(4) it is to be inferred that the rivalry between Iran and UAE cannot pave way for wars as a retaliation strategy to forced occupation. As significant as the historical claims may account for in the given situation, the claims can never be used as an excuse to “self-defence” by either of the nations to announce war. To this extent, the policies of each regional power were designated to sought concrete objectives in terms of international relations. For instance, with regard to territorial disputes whose resolution leadership of Iran considered essential before the transfer of former colonial authorities to the local sheikhdoms, the Bahrain issue was the first to be resolved in a statesmanlike manner (Zabih, 1976). Iran has frequently cited this resolution as indicative of her peaceful and non-belligerent attitude toward territorial disputes (Zabih, 1976). However, the withdrawal of British created power vacuum which resulted in scepticism pertaining to the territorial claims over economically strategic islands of Abu Musa and Tunb Islands. For strategic as well as historical and prestige reasons, Iran felt that the British colonial decision in assigning these islands to two of the sheikhdoms should not survive the British departure east of Suez (Zabih, 1976).

By letter dated 3 December 1971 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider "the dangerous situation in the Arabian Gulf area arising from the occupation by the armed forces of Iran of the islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb, on 30 November 1971" (UN.org, 2014). While the representative of Iraq subsequently maintained that "Greater and Lesser Tunb which were an integral part of Ras Al-Khaima, and by partial occupation of the adjacent island of Abu Musa under the pretext of an alleged agreement with the Shah of Al-Sharjah of whose territory that island was a part, Iran had violated its international obligations under the Charter, in particular Article 2, paragraph 4, which recognized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by the use of force, the representative of Somalia observed that the parties should settle their dispute amicably so that the region might be assured of peace, security and stability (UN.org, 2014). The two-countries reached consensus on the issue of Abu Musa initially but failed negotiations over the Tunb Islands mandated international intervention which essentialises the peaceful presence of each country. The negotiations cannot however proceed on the basis of mere historical claims but the persisting economic and commercial claims must also be rendered important.

Another significant aspect which is worth scrutinizing is the role played by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), an independent structure of the United Nations. This Court which is entrusted with the great task of effecting binding settlements in disputes between States on the basis of international law, consists of fifteen independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to high judicial office, or who are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law (Hambro, 1954). Cases may come before the ICJ, by referral through a compromise (special agreement) between two or more states, by a treaty provision committing disputes arising under the treaty to the court, or by the parties' statements of compulsory jurisdiction (International Court of Justice , 1945). Article 36 of the Statue encompasses the jurisdiction of the Court in the following cases:

- a) the interpretation of a treaty;
- b) any question of international law;
- c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;

- d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation (Article 36(2), ICJ Statute).

Moreover, Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ encompasses the scope of the Court to decide cases through various sources of law such as:

- a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
- b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
- c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
- d) Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law (Article 38, ICJ Statute).

For the purposes of issue pertaining to annexation and sovereignty, the above-mentioned articles provide the context to the international lens. The issue concerning the Island dispute can be resolved through binding implication of the Statute of ICJ. Brian Tylor Sumner through his note titled “Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice” argued that nine categories may be considered for justifying territorial claims: treaties, geography, economy, culture, effective control, history, *uti possidetis*, *elitism*, and ideology (Sumner, 2004).

By the virtue of ratifying treaties, the parties aim at relinquishing historical claims over the property in question and pave way for consolidated control over the region. Likewise, the MoU signed between Sharjah and Tehran intended to formulate joint-civil administration which sustains support as an evidence before the ICJ but the matter cannot be resolved only on the basis of the treaty because there exists a cultural repulsion to international mediation in Iran. For instance, according to the Iranian scholarship, the Islamic regime in Iran is inherently opposed to any third-party role in the islands dispute because of its revolutionary commitment to Iranian autonomy in the context of foreign policy issues (Al-Mazrouei, 2015). It is however an irrefutable fact that UAE enjoys support from Western nations and that the claims made by the country remain more persuasive because throughout the colonial period the Shah worked to accumulate historical evidences. On the other hand, Iran claimed that Sharjah had violated the MoU by constructing new buildings without permission from Iran as well as importing third-party nationals (Al-Mazrouei, 2015). The legal approach in this aspect fails because Iran

remains sceptical of the support UAE managed to rally from the Arab League, the GCC, Western nations, the UN and the European Union.

Is Iran Under an Obligation to Negotiate?

The process of negotiation is a formal tactic used by the countries to reach consensus over an issue. It is defined as a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present (Ikle, 1964). Although an obligation to negotiate may be highly desirable, it appears that at present there is no general obligation imposed on states, applicable in all situations of dispute or disagreement, to enter into negotiations as a matter of customary or conventional international law (Rogoff, 1994). The ICJ however has previously ruled that under certain circumstances, the countries become obligatory to negotiate with one another. In addition, once it is determined that an obligation to negotiate exists as a matter of customary or conventional international law, the content of that obligation may be determined by closely scrutinizing the nature of the substantive rights of the states involved (Rogoff, 1994).

Article 33 of the UN Charter states that: *“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security... shall their own choice.”* The use of “any dispute” resonates to the fact that the dispute shouldn’t necessarily be international in nature and to this extent the ICJ had held that the scope of Article 33 is broader than perceived by mere reading of the Article. For instance, in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ held that the states involved in the continental shelf boundary disputes were obligated under customary international law to delimit the disputed areas by negotiation and eventual agreement (North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J.). It is a recognised fact that states are under an obligation to negotiate, at least in those situations where the extent of their rights can only be defined by reference to the rights of other states (Rogoff, 1994). Thus, in the given the case, various international law principles may be applied to conclude that Iran holds a general obligation towards negotiations but by the virtue of Article 33 and ICJ precedents, it becomes evident that if security concerns solidify, the negotiations will become pertinent and essential to reach a solution that best fits the interests of both the parties. Moreover, it is observed that “nations’ sovereignty” must be maintained and its independence from any political factor is important. Hence, Iran must become obligatory to negotiate in this context to prevent exploitation and violation of UAE’s sovereignty if it holds any.

Conclusion

In the light of foregoing facts and analysis it can be concluded that the dispute between UAE and Iran over the occupation of Abu Musa and Tunb Islands is complex in historical and ideological aspect. Through historical analysis it was concluded that both Iran and UAE present contradictory stories in the pretext of British imperialism. While the scholars heavily criticise, the role played by British empire and their inadequacy in reaching a solution, it must be kept in mind that present legal dimensions convey nuanced arrangements of negotiations which goes against the cultural roots of Islamic States. Iran rightly accuses the international forum of being a centre of western manifestations and UAE of its claims gaining momentum at the outset of persuasive value of western nations. The tough stance of Iran imposes the discrediting nature of the UN negotiations and ever-persisting nature of the dispute. It can be also concluded that Iran remains under an obligation to settle the negotiations with UAE owing to the claims regarding sovereignty, security concerns of the nations and probable situation of war.

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