When Global Ethics Fails: A Meta-Ethical Inquiry into Distant Rescue

Josuke Ikeda

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Introduction

The emergence of 'global ethics' marks one high point in the current study of World Politics. Originally started in the separate realms of Political Philosophy and of International Relations, the streams have converged into a wider project to explore an acceptable framework to support activities on a global scale. The result thus has been an expanding literature advocating global morality, defending it against communitarian and other camps, setting up more sophisticated theories to provide ethical reasons for particular deeds and situations, and applying these frameworks to a variety of phenomena. Once recognised as naïve and somewhat idealistic, the study of ethics in a global context is forming a firm foundation to advance our understanding on the figuration and transformation of the world.

In more specific context, the issue of distant rescue has been a central problem for consideration in global ethics. At the surface level, this has been typically captured as the conflict between human rights and state sovereignty (Falk 1981), and yet a deeper problem underlies it. It is all about the demarcation between a particular political community and global society, and the prioritisation of the former over the latter. These questions touch one of the most fundamental aspects of Politics, the duality of human belonging. Being a man of the world *and* a citizen in a specific community *at the same time* often involves a particular dilemma compelling a person to choose. Some, like Antigone, reject the justice of particular community. Others have chosen, like Hegel, to enshrine the state as not only apolitically but also morally crucial element for human life. The debate has been replicated in a contemporary fashion, in which some advocate being a man prior to being a citizen (Linklater 1990), while others invert that formula (Miller 1995). The issue of distant rescue cannot be liberated from this dichotomy, and from the question of choosing moral priority. Becoming a

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citizen accompanies a particular position of 'pluralist' (Jackson 2000), while choosing to be a global citizen leads to being a 'solidarist' (Wheeler 1992; 2000). And one may recall that theoretical rivalry between them had been taking place almost exclusively at the issue of distant rescue.

Facing such a moral dilemma, nevertheless, it has almost always been the position of global solidarism which took precedence. Being backed by the ideas of utilitarianism (Goodin 1984), human rights (Vincent 1986; ICISS 2001), social contract theory (Caney 2005; Brock 2010) and Kantian deontology (O'Neill 1986; Tesón 2005), numerous defences have been made, and a number of prescriptions have been set. Whichever position is taken, the ethical conclusions are more or less the same –'go and do as he did.'

In the real world, distant rescue does fail. The failure takes various forms, including by-standing and untimely intervention as well as withdrawal. Even rescue itself may bring fresh conflict and oppression. Often problems in such situations are identified not in the moral foundation itself, but in technical matters; it has been about holding right authority; realising collective political will; achieving reasonable success; and providing adequate account with transparency. This paper does not ignore these technical elements, but will dig out the problem further. And it argues that the chief responsibility rests on the moral foundation itself, the failure of global ethics. The claim itself is not so new –as seen later, scholars standing on sociological institutionalism and post-structuralism have already offered attacks toward global ethics. The point which this paper raises, however, is that these accounts make the key of their criticism remain obscure. Accordingly, they eventually offer an unsatisfactory picture regarding what is precisely happening when global ethics fails. The failure of global ethics is, in one sense, a human error. But it also entails another aspect of logics. Existing accounts have been interested in the former aspect, but not in the latter. And this paper focuses on the side of logical error in global ethics.

To clarify the argument above, the paper will introduce expertise from meta-ethics. It is important to note that, for the most of the time, global ethics has been global normative ethics. To shift our focus towards meta-ethics enables us to think what is happening when one expresses normative concern. More importantly, introducing meta-ethical lens may help to identify logical conjuncture/disjuncture of global ethics. Often, as post-structuralism typically says, global ethics is *always already* flawed. Yet the problem to explore further is what it exactly means. The meta-ethical account would help us to see why global ethics fails, always, already.

The next section is devoted to a brief overview regarding the failure of distant rescue and of global ethics. Section two will especially focus on the poststructuralist claims concerning the (im) possibility of global ethics, which is going to be the direct springboard to enter further analysis with meta-ethics, in section three. Overall, the paper aims to claim that linking

critical approach with meta-ethics makes sense, while it also argues that behind rescue failure there is moral deficit, which is driven by logic.

1. When Distant Rescue Fails, How and Why

Historically speaking, the phenomenon of distant rescue has had mixed aspects. On the one hand, as a target, civilians had long been excluded from rescue. When Athens invaded Melos in the Peloponnesian War, people were simply either killed or sold into slavery. Quite a similar situation happened in A.D. 410, when Rome had fallen. On the other hand, different cases can be identified for the inclusion of civilians in the story of the Exodus, when Moses went to Egypt to liberate the people of Israel. The system of asylum had been developed in ancient Greece and Rome, where particular places were designated to take refuge and exempt the power of prosecutors. The Crusades in the Middle Age had a clear purpose of liberating people oppressed by non-Christian kings, while the Crusades themselves became violent to harm Islam. The activity of rescuing people, after all, has had the character of engagement and indifference, inclusion and exclusion of particular groups of people, and political tactics and moral proscription of rescue doers, none of which had been fixed. The mixed tenet of distant rescue therefore makes it difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate. Whether a certain activity of saving people in a distant land was successful or not depended wholly on each case, and eventually, on the goals through which rescue would be achieved. From this point of view, having moral evaluation judging success or failure clearly reflects the idea about distant rescue itself, and indeed such idea is also a historical reflection about how one should treat the other in a difficult situation. As a working definition, this paper understands distant rescue as any kinds of active engagement to save strangers apart from own realm. Having said that, such understanding of rescue is not the most suitable. Saving people usually takes a form of action and not inaction, while the ancient mode of saving people who had fled had long been asylum which did not accompany clear deeds. The meaning of 'stranger' has also been changing. The commonality between the 50 daughters of Danaus in *the Suppliants* and the two million people freed by Moses is not only that they were strangers to the rescuers, but also the fact that they nevertheless still held certain ties with which enabled rescue. Saving *complete* strangers based on no special ties had been less frequent, and it is the introduction of humanity and humanitarianism that broadened the range of those who should be saved, and eventually changed traditional practices of rescue. As the first step to consider the rescue failure, it is necessary to admit that investigating the failure itself is based on modern inclusion of people as the target of rescue: more people having been saved, more expectation on the globalizing rescue, more gaps between the ideal of global rescue and actual practice, and more concerns for such gaps.

But additional challenge comes regarding the idea of failure. Almost as similar background, the meaning of failure varies from time to time, and place to place. When we say this or that rescue fails, do we mean a situation which neglects the sufferings of untied people

completely and lets them die? Or may we include another case in which international society intervened, but which ended with a massacre because of its withdrawal? It would be difficult to evaluate the United Nation's diplomatic efforts to halt the killings occurring in Syria, since it already contains the ability, by international society through diplomatic channels, as well as the disability, to stop actual attacks on civilians. Most of the actual situations and historical cases are scattered in-between the complete success of saving all desperate people who are suffering, and the complete failure of being annihilated. And demarcating the line of success or failure does not belong to the business of moral evaluators but to that of policymakers and statespeople. Nevertheless, it may be maintained that we still regard certain situations as failing to rescue people. Firstly, it will be the failure when people targeted to be saved are not saved.[2] Secondly, we cannot say the rescue is successful if actual operations cause harm to the people. Finally, a situation can be seen as failed when it does not contribute to solving the problem which inflicts sufferings on the people. The point is all of them are proposed in consequentialist stance. There might be a situation of saving people successfully in which the political intention of the rescuers is wrong. Yet often it is difficult to establish whether such intention was morally indictable or not. In such case we should be content to have criteria with which we may evaluate situations in a trackable manner.

Having acknowledged such historical and ideational settings, then, one may classify the stories of investigation. The classic line of thought can be called 'political realism.' Here the basic reason for failing distant rescue is attributed to political hurdles. It sometimes takes the form of direct confrontation between human rights versus states sovereignty. The morality to save people is thwarted by the high wall of state supremacy. Theoretically speaking, this is the matter of making a striking balance between state and human rights, and not only political realists, but also the pluralist side of the English School shows their cautious attitude. And indeed this becomes the starting point for the contemporary development of international intervention (ICISS 2001). Different argument can also be possible, though it focuses more on the lack or mismatching of collective political will (UN 2000, para. 5; UN 2004, para 303; UN 2009, para. 59). The point is that members of international society know that they are already standing in a position to take over sovereign rights to save people, which mean they have cleared the first hurdle. What is necessary however is the final push from the members themselves, and it is sometimes tied together to hold strong international leadership to make rescue happen. Standing the second position, it is requested that each statesperson would make a virtuous political decision; otherwise rescue would be unsuccessful.

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[2] Sometimes people prioritize number, asking whether success and failure can be judged by how many lives are saved and how many lost, as well as the difference between them. It often occupies a considerable part of utilitarian thinking. One difficulty with it is linking numbers with success and failure primarily goes to the realm of effectiveness, then being interpreted as morally desirable, but to equate efficiency with moral supremacy neither offsets the lives lost nor justifies deeds to do not lead to rescuing them. And yet that line of thought still works, so long as one accepts that every moral evaluation has private and public aspects.

Apart from political realism, another stream can be found in the literature of sociological institutionalists. The first point to see is their argument that failure occurs not in the level of international politics, but of international institutions. There is thus little political conflict identified between those who intervene and those who accept possible external actions. The point of focus is narrowed down to what is happening in the organizations which coordinate rescue operations. Institutionalists usually presuppose that a rescue failure happens through misconduct, malfunction, and 'unintended consequence,' and analyse how and why such result had occurred. Contemporary writings offer more specific scrutiny focusing on the intimacy between power and bureaucracy (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 2004: esp chapter 2). They recognise organizations (often international organizations) as a complex of different types of authority, according to which exercises its own power, creating values and standards, setting the environment for particular problems, and so forth. Their authority varies from material, including finance and manpower, as well as non-material, such as agenda-setting and value creating power. 'Pathology' is then set between organization's authority and their unintended behaviour (*Ibid*: 34-41). In this sense they correctly succeed views from Max Weber and Robert Merton, and connect in a skilful way.

From the point of global ethics, their analyses give a view that such power of bureaucracy entails its authority of morals. International organizations, according to second view, embody and exercise global ethics through authoritative manner (*Ibid*: 23). Their observations are important since they may shift our attention from mere political confrontation between politics and ethics to the very foundation of ethics itself. Rescue fails neither because of its political obstacles nor of a country's allegiance for non-intervention. It is because of the ethics of distant rescue itself, and its close link with institutions and its authority. Quite similar line of understanding failure appears in critical IR, which can be seen as third approach. To be fair to them, it is rather this critical camp which originally presented their analyses on the power-ethics nexus. Their observation covers a wider scope than humanitarian intervention, from complex emergency and famine aid (Edkins 2000) to forced displacement and refugee protection (Soguk 1999; Hyndman 2000). Poststructuralism is introduced as major framework of analyses. By their observations they clearly demarcate themselves from institutionalists in two senses. One is their understanding of power. Both institutionalists and critical IR shares a notion that power is socially constructed. But while the former's idea on power is limited to the realm of bureaucracy, usually the latter assumes much wider phenomena. The Foucauldian conception of power as ubiquitous network (Hyndman: Chapter 4) is often invoked, or the process of taming 'the political' through 'depoliticization' or 'technologization' (Edkins 1999: 9). [3]Another difference can be found in

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[3] Jenny Edkins uses such expressions based on her division between 'the politics' and 'the political,' each of which corresponds to Max Weber's ideas on politics and bureaucracy (Edkins 1999: 1). She defines the former as technology of governance and the latter as acts for establishing political status and order (*Ibid*: 2-3). In this

their arguments. Sociological institutionalists recognise failure as genuine failure –it is after all the malfunction of organizations, and they cannot achieve their original goals because of it. Critical IR sets very different claims that the actual activity to save people does achieve success –their point is that such success on distant rescue always occurs within the 'technologization' of rescue activity, and it is depoliticalisation itself which is ultimately flawed. Here it is important to see that the meaning of failure is also quite different between them. Again from institutionalists' eyes failure means the situation in which institutions cannot work properly and thus are unable to save people. Yet from critical perspective, real failure exists in the phenomenon that international community successfully operates through its governance, in which people are tamed and being subjugated under humanitarian operations. It is precisely this point which Nevzat Soguk or Giorgio Agamben present, as a paradox of humanitarianism, by comparing the plans of a refugee camp of a concentration camp and showing how similar they are (Agamben 1998; Sogok 1999). While institutionalists argue that distant rescue *incidentally* fails, critical IR says it *always* does.

None of them can provide both sufficient explanations towards the matter of rescue failure. At the first sight, the account of political moralism successfully provides a simple but clear picture why distant rescue is blocked, but when one looks back in detail, there are few cases in which a rescue effort was thwarted by any of the elements which they have listed. Activities taken by non-governmental organizations have skilfully averted the issue of state sovereignty and the principles of non-intervention, while such actors do express their concern through their own political channels. It is true that the issue of non-intervention has been taken up at the level of inter-state politics, when Russia vetoed resolutions in the case of Chechnya, or China did in the case of Syria. Yet such actions should be seen as a matter of selectivity rather than reflecting their concern on non-intervention by comparing the cases above with that of Libya, in which these two countries submitted abstention and yet not opposition.[4] Even the matter of collective will does not become the threshold, partly because it does not specify which precise number would meet 'collective' will. What the situation in Iraq presented was the case that a number is not always relevant for 'collective will'; the more important aspect was like-mindedness. Political realists say politics takes precedence and eventually blocks humanitarian actions. Yet for the precisely same reason it facilitates distant rescue.

Even taking the different position of sociological institutionalism cannot meet the requirement for accounting for rescue failure. The primary problem with institutionalism is its presupposition that global ethics basically works and that failure occurs exceptionally.

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sense it is true that even critical IR's analyses share the same foundation on power, even though its argument becomes diverse (In the writings of Edkins, for example, she argues that the politics of technologizing the world eventually fails because of its 'undecidability' in Derridean sense. See *Ibid*, p.5).

[4] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (S/RES/1973), 17 March 2011.

Again at the surface it may seem to be the case, but taking the third position of critical IR seriously, we can hardly accept the claim that global ethics incidentally harm people on selected occasions. In this sense, thus, there are good reasons to follow what critical IR people offered. As long as we recall the meaning of failure in distant rescue, which has been set at the outset of this section, failure occurs not incidentally, but *necessarily*. People suffering in a humanitarian catastrophe may be further harmed both by institutional error as well as its proper function. The effective measures brought by the UN and other organizations to protect Internal Displacement Persons (IDPs) eventually shut down the possibility of IDPs to cross boundaries and seek their refuge outside their countries (Dubernet 2001). What critical IR has revealed is the situation in which effective function of humanitarian governance brings harmful effects to those who need to be saved, and in this sense the governance may fail at any time. This poststructuralist interpretation is further reinforced by misconduct of peacekeepers and aid workers who are quite apart from bureaucracy. Their sexual exploitation in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (UN 2002) is not an institutional problem; it is simply a fresh harm.

2. The (Im) possibility of Distant Rescue –Poststructuralist Perspectives

The deficiencies presented in the previous section thus lead us to the third position of critical IR. Here 'critical' owes, to a considerable extent, to poststructuralist literature, and in this section two major observations are to be reviewed –the Foucauldian and the Derridean. Critical observations about global humanitarian governance can be undertaken from these two positions. They commonly focus on what drives people or things in governance; while the former uses the term 'discipline' or 'power,' the latter refers to 'force.' Neither of these positions recognises 'failure' as un-accomplishment, reversed consequences, or misconduct of rescuing agent. Rather what they problematize is the situation in which rescuing activity is successfully on-going. Then they attempt to reveal the dynamic behind this, which links to the subjugation of saved population. The Foucauldian sees the rescue governance as the exercise of disciplinary power; the Derridean understands it as the dominance of certain values over the others.

In the study of World Politics, it is the Foucauldian approach which has been more frequently used for scrutiny. Indeed, what Foucault himself had done is his archaeological or genealogical inquiry into particular aspects of development in human society. It was after all a history of madness, of punishment and education, and of sexuality, all of which were related to particular phenomena in human society. What he revealed was a radically different picture of power, which was de-centralised, everyday-exercised, and apart from physical, top-down violence. The very understanding of Foucauldian power as the one to let live, and not the power to kill, has been especially suitable for critical inquiries to see how saving people may eventually turn into the subjugation of them. The result is the emergence of studies

connecting governance as the exercise of power (Larrinaga and Doucet 2010; Chandler and Hynek 2010).

When especially focusing on refugees and displacement problems, Foucauldian observation takes two broader forms. One is the idea that refugees and displaced people are the outsiders of modern statecraft. The claim is backed and reinforced through Foucault's genealogy on excluded people, such as the insane, on the one hand, as well as his idea of biopolitics on the other. The point closer to the distant rescue is, this approach argues that the system to save refugees –international refugee regime– is regarded as an extension of biopolitics. Debates on relevant conventions, in particular the usage of specific words, such as 'asylum' or 'temporary protection,' reflect how international society makes and remakes the demarcation line between the citizen and the other (Soguk 1999: Chapter 4; Kennedy 2005: Chapter 7). Humanitarian intervention is considered to restore modern statehood (Soguk 1999: 188-204). International regimes are 'successful' in terms of exercising biopower and maintain modern statecraft which is nevertheless a failure for its objects –refugees.

Another related observation submits the picture in which 'humane' and 'inhumane' treatment get overlapped. The starting point is the similarity of controlling technique between what Foucault found through the birth of modern prisons (Foucault 1995) and what others found in the development of refugee camps (Hyndman 2000). Having said that, this second stream goes even further beyond Foucault's analysis. A different key can be found in the situation of 'emergency.' From the point of statecraft, refugees and displaced people are the ones embodying the abnormality of state sovereignty. And if, as Soguk argued, an international refugee regime is inserted to restore statecraft at a global level, it means rescuing the displaced may be a part of extraordinary measures for a state emergency. The thesis that an exceptional situation allows exceptional measures is now passed and reanalysed into Agamben, where he argues that the camp becomes 'the place in which the most absolute *conditio inhumana* that has ever existed on earth was realized (Agamben 1997: 166). The 'camp' he is talking about is the concentration camp, and it is the exact opposite of what humanitarians set, see, and talk about. Nevertheless, what still cannot be ignored is the curious linkage between these opposites. Both two different kinds of camps are still based on the breakdown of statecraft. 'It is produced at the point at which the political system of the modern nation-state (…) enters into a lasting crisis, and the State decides to assume directly the care of the nation's biological life as one of its proper tasks (*Ibid*: 174-75).' In a contemporary context, this type of crisis is often called as 'complex humanitarian emergency' (Edkins 2000), and when recalling that human displacement is the core phenomena of it (Väyrynen 2000), arguments such as Hyndman's or Agamben's have implications to the issue of global humanitarian governance in general.

Turning to the Derridean viewpoint, then, perhaps one reason why there are less critical observations on global humanitarian governance is because of the targets which Derrida

originally analysed. Unlike Foucault, Derrida had not focused directly on human society. His indictment of 'logocentrism,' as well as his use of '*deconstruction*' and '*différance*' appears in the realm of literature criticism. Later Derrida himself makes a kind of jump, to talk about *deconstruction* closer to the social scientific field. And yet his idea 'force of law' has mainly been welcomed by legal scholars (Derrida 1992). Comparing this to the Foucauldian approach, there may be a much smaller number of writings linking global governance, distant rescue, and Derrida.[5]

In this sense it may be useful to demonstrate Derridean engagement to investigate the failure of distant rescue. The key for him is the structure of thought embodied in global humanitarianism. Generally speaking, human thought always comprises 'binary oppositions': mind/body; written language/spoken language; right/wrong; beauty/ugliness, and truth/dogma. These sets of dichotomies also form a particular order on ideas, which often takes the form of the former's dominance over the latter. However, such dominance is not only coercive and violent, but also vulnerable. It is weak as the former term, which dominates, always needs to refer to the latter, in order to form its identity. The present order of any thought may be shaken through difference and *différance*.

When, having summarized the basic idea of Derridean *deconstruction*, one applies this whole story to distant rescue and global humanitarianism, one may find two things. First, as other conceptual settings, there are a number of sets of ideas about distant rescue, based on binary oppositions. Action always comes first, rather than indifference or by-standing. Such actions should be done collectively, rather than in a separate, unilateral form. Prevention is always prior to reaction. Such rescue should be legitimate, and not without authorisation. And after all, all of such measures are temporary rather than permanent, because it is done in an emergency and not normal life. Importantly, these oppositions already form the backbone of 'global ethics' of humanitarianism. Whichever one takes: Kantian, right-based, or utilitarian approach, or even relying on a Just War analogy, these sets of dichotomy are usually embedded, or embodied. Switching one's eyes to actual cases, the same case can be made. These oppositions appear in almost all policy documents regarding global humanitarian policies (CHS 2003; ICISS 2001; UN 1998; 2000; 2004; 2005; 2009; 2010). Through Derridean eyes, almost the whole of global ethics for rescue is constituted by a number of binary oppositions. Second, however, following the line of Derrida's thought, such

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[5] This of course does not mean there have been no notable observations in World Politics. Probably one may still agree Richard Ashley's analyses to deconstruct state sovereignty (Ashley 1986; 1989) belongs one of the most thorough-going criticism to an IR concept, applying Derridean method. However his critical practices have not been carried into much specific context, including global governance. Derrida's 'answers' such as 'deconstruction as justice' or his idea of 'hospitality' are partly used to propose alternative measures to save the excluded, there seems to be still considerable amount of lack regarding to the analyses of why, and how, seemingly successful rescue, taken in the form of governance, actually fails.

oppositions are always already flawed. Prevention is almost already the reaction of preceded events. NATO airstrikes in Kosovo were without UN authorisation. Unilateral intervention has also been accepted as 'new humanitarianism' (Wheeler 2000: 47) and in fact exercised in Iraq War with the emergent form of the 'Coalition of the Willing.' Such actions were of course recognised as illegitimate, but members of international society did run against their own rules and order, since they also know the very principle for action cannot be achieved, and thereby they have to remain by-standers, until they are waiting to meet all ethically desirable criteria, which happened in Rwanda, and almost in Syria. What is happening there is not just moral dilemma –it reflects how once consolidated moral principles on distant rescue simply do not work, not because of the political hurdles such as realism, but because of their very own requirements. To use Derrida's words, setting moral principles for distant rescue is 'impossible,' because it is undecidable. Certain prescriptions or proscriptions might dominate, and in fact do, among a number of ethical principles supporting rescue. Derridean observation reveals that such moral order simply collapses.

3. The (Im) possibility of Distant Rescue: A Meta-Ethical Perspective

Having seen two major criticisms from Foucauldian and Derridean viewpoints, it may be maintained that distant rescue fails at a fundamental level. It is not the matter of technical mishandling or malfunction of international humanitarian regimes. Nor is it because of political confrontation for the sake of state/human rights. Ultimately, the failure of distant rescue is a moral defect. It brings both rescue and harm to the actual field. The point to understand is the extent of failure itself. Even if successful at the operational level, it may become a 'failure' if rescue activity brings further harm and subjugation of the saved. The poststructuralist line of thinking problematizes precisely this point, and as long as one follows it, one may reach a conclusion that distant rescue is *always already* failed –it has *always* failed since, as Derrideans think, the moral order for rescue is flawed at structural level, and the morally desirable value is inverted by the morally inferior, thereby it is impossible to decide which moral value is ultimately superior; it is *already* failed because the act of setting international regimes or moral order is the very beginning of bringing harm or subjugating the saved.

Then one may reasonably ask why not stopping the whole story here. To be sure introducing a meta-ethical perspective after poststructuralist analyses can run one specific risk. What the poststructuralist view has presented is not only the failure of distant rescue. Closer to their position is the idea that moral defects always occur as long as global ethics is relying on a particular type of theorising, which may eventually leads to the failure of rescue. Often such theorisation requires metaphysical foundation on ethics, as well as corresponding epistemology and logics. Now once having rejected the metaphysical-epistemological-logical triad of morality, inserting meta-ethics, which embodies this triad, may seem to go in the completely opposite direction. There are mainly two reasons to go ahead, however. One is

because meta-ethics this time may supplement critical observation by clarifying what precisely is happening when a moral order is being inflicted. For instance, one claim with the Derridean approach is that his idea of 'archi-violence' is exercised at the moment when any ideas are established. This is when one binary opposition is being made in knowledge, and when certain element of it takes dominance over the others. And yet such process is occurring in the realm of epistemology and logics, and unless we clarify what is happening at these levels we cannot fully understand what '"archi-violence" has been exercised' means. Because the whole criticism is made towards ethics, we need to see the realm of epistemology and logics of morality, and it is meta-ethics which covers the area. In short, meta-ethics is introduced to see what is exactly at stake. Such a first point can be followed by additional reason. After revealing the failure of distant rescue as a moral defect, critical IR suggests abandoning the metaphysical basis for the activity. This does not, however, constitute a reason to reject rescue itself: the matter is rather how to reach a decision to move. It entails deliberation. What critical IR tells us is that this should not be the application of moral principles; rather it is judgement. Normative ethics in general, whether one endorses a consequentialist or deontological position, cannot account the nature of deliberation and of judgement. Again it is the role of meta-ethics.

Having set reasons to proceed further, then, if we keep talking about the moral deficit of distant rescue by succeeding Derridean understanding and connecting it to the realm of meta-ethics, the first implication can be gained as anti-Moral realism. In meta-ethics, realism is an idea that morality is based on facts which exist in the real world. In this sense it is trackable, and possible to judge if it is true or not. Thus moral realism is also belongs what is called cognitivism, a stance that moral facts exist and they are truth-apt. Such moral realism was firstly and thoroughly rejected by G.H. Moore (Moore 1993), with his famous claim of 'natural fallacy' –it is simply wrong to derive 'ought' from 'is', or prescription from description. His rejection was a strong blow, but not in one point. Moore's solution to replace what he called 'naturalism' created another problematic position of 'moral intuitionism.' The difference between them depends on whether moral fact exists as natural fact does– naturalists say yes, while intuitionists say no. Moore was unique enough to invent his own position of moral intuitionism, by saying moral fact still existed in the form which natural fact did not take, but he could not afford to provide a way which we can catch moral facts apart from natural facts. More problematic is that both naturalism and intuitionism still belong to moral realism, acknowledging that morality ultimately 'exists.' And it is important to note that the history of 20th century meta-ethics sets the rejection of moral realism as the starting point.

The second blow came from what is called non-cognitivism, as the counterpart of Moore and others. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that the history of 20th century meta-ethics was the development of, and around, non-cognitive theory. Among a number of scholars, the initial criticism was probably the most striking and provocative, an argument from the British

philosopher A.J. Ayer (Ayer 1936/1971). His argument that ethical statement is nothing more than expressing the person's emotion and therefore never truth-apt (*Ibid*: 140; 143; 144) has an important implication with his grand scope of the 'elimination of metaphysics (*Ibid*: chapter 1).' There is surely a difference between Derrida and Ayer. While the former accused metaphysics because it entailed 'violence' to set particular discourse as 'philosophy,' the latter attacked it simply because it did 'not make sense.' More important cleavage can be found between them, since Derridean deconstruction is situated in fundamental criticism towards Western Philosophy in general, while Ayer is located in fundamental sophistication of it: logical positivism. Obviously we cannot ignore time differences as well. Having said, they still share common scepticism towards what (people had thought) makes philosophy, metaphysics. If one recalls again that most literature of global ethics supporting distant rescue are based on 'metaphysical' ideas of utility, rights, dignity or duty, one may find these positions can be eroded not only from a critical perspective such as Derrida's, but also from the meta-ethical position of Ayer.

Then, another question comes if, supposing anti-metaphysical attitude to be the right option to clarify the moral deficit, we may endorse Ayer's argument instead of Derrida's, and the answer is still negative. In the first place, to say that metaphysics does not simply make sense is not to clarify what is happening when ethics is being established for rescue. Often ethics does establish the metaphysics of global morality in itself, and it functions along with it. However critics describe it as nonsense, it actually exists, or at least is deemed to exist, in international society. More meaningful insight can be identified in Ayer's argument of emotivism. Usually international society does express its concern when faced with humanitarian issues. Typical examples can be found in resolutions of the United Nations. It is also arguable that recent study on global ethics is focusing on the growth of cosmopolitan emotion (Linklater 2011: 205-230). If Ayer is true, global ethics for rescue is no more than the emotions expressed, and as long as we see both theory and practice regarding to distant rescue, we are inclined to submit positive answer to emotivism.

Nevertheless Ayer's position has one flaw in one point, regarding to its correctness. In meta-ethics, to what extent expressed emotion can be reliable has been a matter of debate. The core question is 'how this projection can be anything other than a *mistake* or an *error* (Miller 2003: 39, emphasis in original).' In world politics, it is hardly imaginable that international society as a whole shares a united wrong emotion. Yet it is possible to imagine that its members cannot reach an agreement on the sense in which they share their concern as its cosmopolitan emotion. Even the case in the UN is based on the majority rule, and this means whether the UN as an organ expresses its 'emotion' still depends on the political dynamics among members. The problem here is, in short, that even if Ayer's emotivism is correct at the individual level, it does not guarantee to fit at the collective level. Taking into account that in world politics it is 'collective moral agents' which take a role for discharging global ethics (Erskine 2004), a hurdle remains intact to make it fit in the global context.

Such problems can partly be solved by R. M. Hare (Hare 1952; 1963; 1981), with his idea of 'command' and 'universalizability.' The starting point is another emotivist idea on ethics: it is not only the expression of feelings but also the one that makes people apt to believe and act towards a certain objective. Seeing ethics as incitement is a part of its conclusion after negating the metaphysical foundation of morals, but it is this argument which Hare carefully rejects. For him ethics belongs to the language of prescription, or 'command,' and 'commands (…) are governed by logical rules (Hare 1952: 15-16; 24),' which is far from incitement. Here the matter of moral deficit is not just a question whether of ethics is mere expression of certain actor(s), nor if ethics induces actors to lead to particular acts. It becomes an inquiry what is behind making actors do so, which eventually goes into the matter of logics. Here he argues that one feature exists in moral logics, called 'universalizability (Hare 1963: 10-12).' According to this criterion, if one moral statement can be possible in a specific situation (e.g. international society should lend a hand those who are suffering harm in Libya), and if the same case occurs on different occasions (human wrongs also occur in Syria, south Sudan, and so forth), the same moral statement is required to be applied to them (international society should also help those needy people in other areas). The power of logics requires following and extending the original statement, so as to achieve a coherent whole of ethical prescription. From the point of moral formation, an obvious advantage of ethical universalizability is that we do not have to seek and establish universal moral *contents*, such as human dignity or human rights. The matter is logic rather than moral property, thus Hare's requirement is formal rather substantive. Such an argument is particularly suitable to the situation in which different actors have different moral properties to respect and yet it is required that they project a collective moral preference. The principle of universalizability can be used as a 'test' in which certain moral principles can be acceptable, not because of its contents, but of its flow of argument (Hare 1981: 115).

From the point of investigating moral deficit, then, what kind of implication can we obtain? Hare's argument tells us that what is occurring inside 'archi-violence,' in constructing a moral order, is the dynamics of logics. It is a logical drive to force us to follow a particular moral statement, and to extend it in similar occasions. The point is that Hare's universalizability can be connected to, and refined by, another relevant idea of 'moral supervenience.' Originally, in meta-ethics, supervenience provides a condition in which similar natural properties follows similar moral properties. Shall we look at it through a simple case:

(a) Mr. Smith has stolen money, and he is wrong.
(b) Mr. Ikeda has stolen money, and he is wrong.

In these sentences, both (a) and (b) carry similar natural properties (that can be investigated to establish whether true or false), as to which, either Mr. Smith or Mr. Ikeda, has stolen money.

Supervenience then asks if (a) occurs, and if (b) is quite the same as (a), the same moral property, which the person is wrong, should be brought into both. The idea of supervenience had once been rejected by Ayer, since it derives moral evaluation from natural status, which belongs to the 'natural fallacy.' Basically neither Ayer nor Hare supports natural fallacy, thus no direct link may be established between Hare's 'universalizability' and supervenience. Nevertheless, by narrowing down the extent of supervenience to the realm of logics, we may still use the idea of supervenience, which can be formed as follows;

    (c) The UN expresses 'boo!' to the situation in Syria.
    (d) NATO expresses 'boo!' to the situation in Syria.

As long as one stands on Ayer's emotivist position, the ethics of distant rescue are expressed by projecting its emotion: 'boo!' to Syria. According to the emotivist, global ethics is nothing more than booing. What Hare inserts is that such booing can only, and indeed, become ethics when it is universalizable. This is logical requirement. Thus when (c) becomes extended to include NATO's booing, it may become the foundation for rescuing Syrian people. What deserves attention is that the extension from (c) to (d) is not the supervenience of natural property, but of *logical* property. Again, in (a) and (b), similar moral properties should be derived when they share similar natural properties. But in (c) and (d), it is similar logical properties which require ethics, booing for Syria. The difference between these two cases regards how ethics can be derived. In the former, ethics comes from similar natural property; in the latter from similar logical property.

Supervenience of natural property and that of logical property are quite different, since the former belongs to the realm of experience while the latter belongs to logics. Philosophically speaking, such division is what Hume had originally set. For him, supervenience occurs in both realms. In the world of experiment, it is usually called precedence. In the world of logics, it is called tautology (Kurki 2008). It is important to note that at the bottom of emotivism there is a huge influence of Humean philosophy. Having said, then, the problem with moral defect may thus be attributed to the tautological structure of logics, which can be followed by related requirement that similar logics should be followed in similar situations. The whole structure seems to be in a sense simple, but at the same time simple enough to hold coherence. And it is this coherence which gives integrity to ethics. Importantly, such integrity does not allow exception simply because it derails the principle of universalizability: in the situation of different cries of booing, it is logically inconsistent to express 'boo!' but not save people at the same time. The requirement of logical supervenience is however neglected in some cases of selective intervention. Often it is difficult to submit the reason why international society saves certain people while not others, [6] and often it is the political situation which is invoked

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[6] One interesting exception has been provided by Chris Brown (Brown 2003), in which he argues 'the search for "universal and uncompromising" moral judgment seems particularly fruitless (*Ibid*: 42).' His claim that political

as the cause –selectivity occurs necessarily because whether-to-go relies on political decisions. Nevertheless, the very reason for selectivity is rather the impossibility to save all people from all humanitarian catastrophes thoroughly, and this impossibility is not only coming from the sheer number of cases to deal with, but also from the logics prescribing us to save people in all similar cases. To be fair to global ethics, the logical requirement of supervenience seems to be one major pillar without which its theoretical architecture cannot be sustained. Yet it is precisely the same requirement which disables distant rescue. In a word, global ethics relies on a theoretical foundation which is already self-defeating.

Conclusion

Considering the question what would come 'after global ethics' has been, in fact, an inquiry for IR scholars for a reasonably long time. It has already become known that invoking conventional frameworks of normative ethics, most notably utilitarian, right-based and deontologist, to particular global moral problems is gradually outdated and inappropriate. Normative IR theorists were quick to concentrate on how to overcome such limitations which ordinary normative ethics could not solve. Their answers cover a wide range of philosophers which normative ethics usually did not concern, such as Gadamar (Shapcott 2001), Rorty (Cochran 2000), and the postmoderns (Campbell and Shapiro 1999). Yet their journeys were the extensions of seeking different frameworks to apply, and in this sense the essential nature of normative IR enquiry has been largely unchanged. They were not eager equally to explicate the reason why global ethics is unworkable, as well as how it faces its own impossibility. One major hurdle seems to be the hidden presupposition demarcating ethics and politics, and considering the former as non-political while the latter is considered indeed political. By regarding ethics as non-political in essence, normative IR theorists have averted the problem of moral failure. On contrary, some political scientists such as realists and sociological institutionalists have regarded moral failure as the problem of politics and bureaucracy. The real point to see is neither of them. Ethics is already political enough to construct a particular moral order. In addition, what drives it from behind is not only the force of politics or 'law,' but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, of logics.

This paper has attempted to give one view for clearing the claims above, by relying on meta-ethics. Perhaps one major fruit so far is that the combination of meta-ethics and a critical approach such as poststructuralism may create a further path to investigate the problem, by clarifying what is happening when global ethics is constructing (and simultaneously destructing) its foundation for global practice. The ideas of the postmoderns, in particular those closer to Derrida's ideas, present ethics failing not because of exogenous factors, rather

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morality is not a matter of following rules rather making decisions seems to have some relevancy to the problem of rescue failure, but this paper may still differentiate it from Brown by focusing not on the nature of politics as decision (and yet interestingly, this is what the Derridean position sees as the point) but on a flaw of ethics itself.

endogenous. Studies of meta-ethics help us to see by providing what kind of operations is underway at the level of epistemology and logics. What can be found at this stage is not quite enough, however. This paper's findings remain limited, such as focusing on the phenomena of 'supervenience,' especially invoking Ayer and Hare. In this sense this is a preliminary analysis which may be extended through adding views regarding supervenience from succeeding generations such as Simon Blackburn (Blackburn 1984; 1998) or Alan Gibbard (1990/1992).

Apart from mentioning the limitations of this paper, it is still possible to add another implication. Related to 'after global ethics,' the possibility of virtue ethics is often mentioned. In the field of World Politics, Chris Brown was one of the earliest scholars to mention the potential usability of it, especially the virtue ethics of Aristotle (Brown 2003; 2010: chapter 6). Brown's argument is that virtue is a good alternative facing theoretical problems on normative ethics, and in many senses his claim may be seen as contemporary revival of the political moralism which traditional realists had emphasised (Wolfers 1962; Kennan 1985/86). Yet his position becomes problematic, if one explores meta-ethics, since it is based on particular understanding of what 'right action' is. From the meta-ethical standpoint, it belongs to the group of moral naturalism (Miller 2003: chapters 8-10), in which the essence of right action can be derived from natural property. Unless one abandons emotivist and non-cognitivist thinking, it is quite difficult to sustain the possibility of Aristotelian virtue ethics for replacing conventional normative ethics; otherwise this alternative will have to deal with a similar type of moral deficit. What this little observation presents is that combining ideas between normative and meta-ethics then will be an important part for studying ethics in World Politics –partly because it clarifies both epistemological and logical foundation of ethical thought, and partly because it tackles the problem of moral deficit. After all, the failure of ethical activities is a failure of ethics. Behind political actions, which is usually seen as a major background, is there the function of logics which compels people to act. And it is the role of meta-ethics which may provide a closer look to clarify it.

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